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Abstract
Internationally active firms rely intensively on trade credits even though they are considered
particularly expensive. This phenomenon has been little explored so far. Our theoretical
analysis shows that trade credits can alleviate financial constraints arising from asymmetric
information because they serve as a quality signal and reduce the uncertainty related to
international transactions. We use unique survey data on German enterprises to test the
effect of the use of trade credits on firms’ exporting and importing behavior, both at the
extensive and intensive margins. Our results support the assertion that trade credits have a
positive impact on firms’ exporting and importing activities.
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1 Introduction
Aggravated trade finance conditions have been suggested as one of the reasons why trade
flows collapsed in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis as well as in past crises (Amiti and
Weinstein (2011)). Indeed, up to 90% of all trade transactions are supported by some form
of trade finance (Auboin (2009)). Surprisingly, though, the main part of trade finance takes
the form of trade credits, which are considered a particularly expensive form of financing:
implicit annual trade credit interest rates can amount to up to 40% (Petersen and Rajan
(1997)).
Trade credits are extended bilaterally between firms and exist in the form of supplier
credits and cash in advance. Cash in advance (CIA) refers to payments made in advance by
the buyer of a good to the seller. In contrast, a supplier credit (SC) is granted from the seller
of a good to the buyer such that the payment of the purchasing price can be delayed for a
certain period of time.1 Why trade credits are so prevalent in international trade, despite
their high cost, has been little studied so far.
This paper aims at closing this gap. We argue that international transactions are inher-
ently subject to more uncertainty than domestic transactions and that trade credits serve as
a quality signal that helps reduce this high uncertainty. Thus, our paper provides a ratio-
nale for the use of expensive trade credits to finance international trade. For this purpose
we develop a model of financially constrained firms that need outside finance to be able to
either export or import. Financial constraints arise from asymmetric information problems
that deter less productive firms from trading and lead to lower trade volumes if only bank
financing is available. Access to trade credits reduces the asymmetric information problem
and thus promotes trade at the extensive and intensive margins.
We test our predictions with data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Per-
formance Surveys (BEEPS) for German firms in 2004. This dataset is ideal for our purposes
since it contains data on the use of trade credits and a direct measure of financial constraints.
We find evidence for trade credits’ fostering exporting and importing at both margins.
The contribution of our paper is thus twofold. First, we are the first to explicitly analyze
the effects of trade credits on the extensive and intensive margins of international trade in a
theoretical framework. In our model, we show that the productivity threshold to profitably
export is lower if a firm is provided with CIA by its foreign trading partner. Moreover, the
firm exports higher volumes with CIA financing. Similarly, we show that access to SC can
facilitate importing.
1In the literature, the term trade credit is sometimes used for credits extended by a bank to support
a trade transaction. When using the term trade credit, we exclusively refer to inter-firm credits that are
extended between firms without any financial intermediation.
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Second, using survey data, we can provide direct evidence of the beneficial effects on
exporters and importers of access to trade credits. This is particularly interesting because
the margins of importing have been little explored so far. In the survey, firms report how
much CIA and SC they give and receive. Furthermore, they provide information on the extent
of their financial constraints. Thus, we need not rely on proxies for trade credit availability
and we avoid problems arising from using indirect measures of financial constraints such as
balance sheet information.2 We apply a two-part model to test the effects of trade credits on
both margins of exporting and importing. Our results for the extensive margin show that
financially constrained firms are less likely to export or to import. CIA availability fosters
exporting for all firms, not only for financially constrained firms. The effect of SC availability
on the probability of importing is also positive, but only for financially constrained firms.
At the intensive margin, while financial constraints have no significant effect, CIA and SC
availability promote export and import volumes.
Our analysis is related to three strands of literature. First, it builds on the literature
on trade credits such as Lee and Stowe (1993). In Lee and Stowe (1993) firms extend trade
credits to signal product quality to their (domestic) customers.3 This signalling motive
should hold a fortiori for international transactions that suffer from an even higher degree
of uncertainty. As we show in our model, even though trade credits are intrinsically more
costly than bank credits, this disadvantage is more than compensated for by the reduction
of uncertainty, so financially constrained firms benefit from access to trade credits.
Only recently has the literature on trade credits taken international transactions into
its focus, investigating the optimal choice of trade credit. In Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2010)’s
model financial market characteristics and contractual environments of both the foreign and
domestic market influence the choice of trade credit by firms. Similarly, Antra`s and Foley
(2011) study how a firm’s choice of using CIA versus SC depends on the extent of contractual
frictions in the foreign trading partner’s country. The authors find empirical support using
data from a large US exporting firm. Ahn (2011) investigates which side of the transaction
should provide a trade credit and finds that it should be the trade partner that disposes of
the larger amount of collateral. Furthermore, he provides an explanation for how a lack of
trade finance could have contributed to the drop in global trade during the financial crisis.
Olsen (2011) focuses on the role of banks in international trade. He shows that by issuing
letters of credit, banks can help to overcome enforcement problems between exporters and
importers. Glady and Potin (2011) provide empirical evidence on the importance of letters
2See Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Fazzari et al. (2000) for a discussion.
3Another paper on the warranty by quality hypothesis was simultaneously developed by Long et al.
(1993). In a more recent paper, Klapper et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence of the quality signalling
motive for a small sample of US and European firms.
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of credit when country default risk is high. Our focus is not on the choice of the trade credit
form as a function of the level of uncertainty. Instead, we investigate why firms choose trade
credit financing instead of the cheaper bank financing. We argue that this is because trade
credits serve as quality signals in international trade that help alleviate financial constraints.
In addition, we show that trade credits foster international trade at both margins.4
The second strand of literature explores the influence of financial constraints on export-
ing behavior. Chaney (2005) and Manova (2010) incorporate financial constraints into the
Melitz (2003) model and show that these constraints can prevent less productive firms from
exporting. In firm-level studies for Italian and Belgian firms, Minetti and Chun Zhu (2011)
and Muuˆls (2008) confirm that less financially constrained firms are more likely to export.
Buch et al. (2010) analyze the export and FDI decisions of German firms. They find that less
credit-constrained and more productive firms are more likely to export and invest abroad
and that financial constraints affect FDI relatively more than exports. Feenstra et al. (2011)
argue theoretically that exporters are more severely affected by financial constraints than
domestic firms, due to the higher risks and longer financing periods in international trade.
We add trade credits to the choice of financing instruments for an internationally active firm.
Whereas some firms cannot profitably export if only bank financing is available, we show
that with the help of trade credits, financially constrained firms can also export.
Finally, our paper is related to a small but growing strand of literature that analyzes the
importing behavior of firms. Kasahara and Lapham (2008) extend the Melitz (2003) model
for intermediate goods and argue that only the more productive firms will be able to import
because of the fixed costs of importing. They find supportive evidence in a sample of Chilean
plants. Vogel and Wagner (2010) report selecting into importing for German manufacturing
firms. Similar results are observed for Swedish, Belgian, and Italian firms (see Andersson
et al. (2008), Muuˆls and Pisu (2009), and Castellani et al. (2010)). Our model and the
empirical results are consistent with the selecting-into-importing hypothesis. In addition,
we look at the effects of financial constraints and trade credit availability on the intensive
margin of importing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we take a first look at trade
credit use in international trade. In Section 3 we develop two variants of a model for a
financially constrained firm, one for an exporter receiving CIA and one for an importer
receiving SC. Section 4 provides further information on the dataset and the empirical strategy
applied to test the predictions derived from our model. In Section 5 we present our empirical
4In a companion paper, Engemann et al. (2011), we use a similar theoretical framework to focus on the
relationship between bank credits and SC for exporting firms. We provide empirical evidence of the comple-
mentary relationship between SC and bank credits for German exporters that are financially constrained.
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analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 A First Look at Trade Credit Use in International
Trade
In this section, we take a first look at the use of trade credits to illustrate that they
are indeed intensively used by internationally active firms. We use data from the Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) on 1196 German firms in 2004.
This survey provides us with all four relevant measures of trade credit use by firms: CIA
given, CIA received, SC given, and SC received. In addition, it contains data on export
and import shares and a self-reported measure of financial constraints. In the survey, firms
indicate whether access to financing is no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a moderate obstacle, or
a major obstacle to their operations. We classify a firm as financially constrained if access
to financing is at least a moderate obstacle to the firm.5
Panel A of Table 2 displays differences in trade credit use by exporters versus non-
exporters. Strikingly, exporters distinctly exhibit a higher use of trade credits than non-
exporters. First, a higher percentage of all exporters receive CIA on sales and give SC
on sales than non-exporters. For example, about 44% of all exporters receive a positive
share of their sales in advance, whereas only 34% of all non-exporters receive CIA. Second,
average shares given and received are higher for exporters than non-exporters. For example,
exporters grant delayed payment on 65% of their sales to customers on average, whereas
non-exporters do so on only about 49% of their sales (SC given). This implies that exporters
use trade credits more actively and more intensively than non-exporters. We also apply
a mean difference test to determine whether the displayed differences in trade credit use
are statistically significant. We find that except for the difference in the average share of
CIA received, all differences are statistically significant. Other well-known characteristics of
exporters are reflected in the data as well: exporters are significantly larger in terms of sales
and employees and are less financially constrained.
In Panel B, we compare trade credit use by importers versus non-importers. We consider
only CIA given on input purchases and SC received on input purchases since CIA received
(on sales) and SC given (on sales) apply to selling instead of purchasing activities. For
the importers in our sample, we also document interesting differences in trade credit use,
but they are less pronounced than for exporters. More importers give CIA and receive SC
than non-importers and the average share of CIA given by importers is also higher than by
5For a more detailed description of the dataset and the variables used in the analysis, please refer to
subsection 4.1.
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non-importers. In contrast, the average share of SC received by importers is lower than by
non-importers. When testing for statistical significance, we only find a significant difference
in the share of firms giving CIA. Apart from that, we find that importers are significantly
larger and less financially constrained than non-importers.
Finally, we display mean differences in trade credit use for financially constrained versus
unconstrained firms in Panel C of Table 2. Financially constrained firms receive higher
average shares of both trade credit forms. Furthermore, relatively more firms that are
financially constrained receive CIA and SC. All differences except for the average share of
SC received are statistically significant.
These descriptive statistics suggest that trade credits play a very important role for
internationally active and financially constrained firms. In the following theoretical model,
we provide an explanation for these findings which is then put to a test in our empirical
analysis.
3 Theoretical Framework
We develop two variants of a model, one for financially constrained exporters and one
for financially constrained importers. Firms differ in their level of productivity and require
external finance to export or import goods. A firm will be able to export (import) only if
its productivity level lies above a threshold that allows it to break even. In our model, this
threshold varies with different financing options that are available to the firm.6
3.1 Financially Constrained Exporters and Cash in Advance
Consider a two-period economy, t = 0, 1, in which a firm considers whether to produce
for the foreign market.7 When producing the quantity x in t = 0, a firm faces the convex
cost function k = x
2
2(1+β)
. (1 + β) denotes the productivity level of the firm so that more
productive firms produce at lower variable costs, β > 0. Following the current literature,
we characterize a firm by its productivity level which determines its decision to become
internationally active (see Melitz (2003)). Additionally, the firm has to incur a fixed cost FEx
associated with foreign market entry, e.g., costs related to the establishment of a distribution
network or market research in the foreign market. At the end of t = 0, the firm sells its
6The idea of varying thresholds for different financing options can also be found in Mateut et al. (2006)
and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) who focus on trade credit extension without reference to international
transactions.
7Since we are interested only in whether a firm can export at all, we exclude domestic transactions from
our analysis.
5
good at price p in the foreign market to an importing firm. In t = 1, the importing firm can
resell the good to final customers in the foreign market at the exogenous market price pˆ and
generate revenue.
We assume that the exporting firm does not possess any internal funds and has to finance
all costs of production externally in t = 0, before any revenues are generated. The importing
firm does not possess any cash, either, to pay for the exporter’s good. There are two
possibilities of how payment by the importer to the exporter can occur: either after delivery
in t = 1, as soon as the importer has generated own revenues, or upfront before the exporter
starts to produce. In the former scenario, the exporter has to finance all production costs via
a bank credit. In the latter scenario, the importer has to access external finance to be able
to pay in advance. We do not consider payment at delivery (at the end of t = 0) because
this implies that both trading partners have to use costly external finance instead of only
one of the partners. Therefore, payment at delivery is strictly dominated.
When payment occurs after delivery, the exporter faces two sources of uncertainty. The
first one is an adverse selection problem with regard to the importer’s type. With probability
µ, 0 < µ < 1, the importer is of high quality (H) and so is able to successfully market the
exporter’s good in the foreign market. With probability 1− µ the importer is of low quality
(L) which means that positive revenues cannot be generated and hence the exporter is not
paid.
Second, a moral hazard problem can occur, due to the long distances in international
trade and difficulties of tracing the importer’s behavior. Instead of selling the good in the
foreign market, the importer can divert the good and derive a private payoff of φx, blaming
adverse market conditions for not generating positive revenues. To fix ideas, we assume that
the market demand for the exporter’s good in the foreign market is uncertain: demand in
the foreign market is positive with probability λ, 0 < λ < 1 and it is zero with probability
1 − λ. No revenues are generated in the latter case and the importer cannot repay the
exporter, even if he is of high quality. We assume that diverting the good is inefficient, i.e.
0 < φ < λpˆ. Whether or not the high-quality importer diverts the good depends on the
price he is supposed to pay to the exporter in case of successfully marketing the good. The
low-quality importer always diverts the good since he cannot successfully market it.8 Hence,
positive export revenues are generated only if the importer is of high quality, market demand
is positive, and the high-quality importer does not divert the good.9
8Including moral hazard is necessary to have type uncertainty in our model. Without any possibility to
divert the good, a low-quality importer would not take part in trade.
9Araujo and Ornelas (2007) also model type uncertainty of exporters and importers in international
trade. They focus on improvements in institutional quality to overcome asymmetric information.
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3.1.1 Pure Bank Credit Financing
In the following, we consider the case in which payment occurs after delivery and the
exporter has to apply for a bank credit to finance all costs of production. The bank credit
can be repaid only if the importer pays for the goods as agreed on. This depends on the
type of the importer, the demand in the foreign market, and the decision whether to divert
or resell the good.
To prevent problems related to moral hazard, for each unit of x sold to the high-quality
importer, the exporting firm demands a price p such that
λ(pˆx− px) ≥ φx.
The high-quality importer’s expected revenues from selling the good and repaying the ex-
porter in case of positive market demand must be at least as high as the gain from diversion.
We assume that the exporter has full market power in setting the price for the good, so p is
given by
p = pˆ− φ
λ
. (1)
Assuming instead that the importer has some, but less than full, market power changes our
results only quantitatively but not qualitatively.
Banks operate under perfect competition and make zero profits. The bank faces the same
uncertainty as the exporter concerning the quality type of the importer and the market risk,
so credit repayment by the exporter is uncertain. For simplicity, we assume that there is no
asymmetric information with regard to the exporter’s quality.10 For the bank to break even,
the following condition has to hold
λµD(1 + rB) = (1 + r¯B)D,
where D stands for the amount lent by the bank which is repaid with probability λµ, i.e., if
the importer is of high quality and market demand is positive. The bank’s expected revenues
have to be equal to the refinancing costs of the bank. (1+ rB) denotes the gross interest rate
the bank charges and (1 + r¯B) refers to the gross refinancing interest rate of the bank. The
collateral in case of non-repayment is normalized to 0. Solving for (1 + rB) yields the gross
interest rate the bank requires to break even:
(1 + rB) =
(1 + r¯B)
λµ
. (2)
10Including exporter uncertainty does not change our results qualitatively.
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The higher the certainty about the foreign market demand and the importer quality, the
lower the interest rate the bank demands. In the case of complete certainty, λ = µ = 1, the
bank demands exactly its gross refinancing rate.
With pure bank credit financing the exporter faces the following profit function:
piBCEx = λµpx− λµ
1 + r¯B
λµ
(
x2
2(1 + β)
+ FEx
)
. (3)
The exporter receives expected revenues of λµpx and finances the total costs of production via
a bank credit. The exporter repays the amount borrowed only in case of positive revenues
(λµ) and is charged an interest rate that takes into account the risk of the international
transaction.
Maximizing the exporter’s profit function with regard to x, we can derive the optimal
quantity exported with pure bank credit financing:
xBCEx =
(1 + β)
1+r¯B
λµ
(
pˆ− φ
λ
)
. (4)
Plugging (4) into the exporter’s profit function (3) and setting the profit equal to zero yields
the minimum productivity level required to make at least zero profit:
(1 + β)BCEx ≡
(
1 + r¯B
λµ
)2
2FEx(
pˆ− φ
λ
)2 . (5)
Firms with a productivity level (1 + β) < (1 + β)BCEx will not be able to export since the
expected costs of external finance are too high for the firm to be able to break even. We
refer to these firms as financially constrained. This definition perfectly matches the
measure of financial constraints given in our dataset. Recall that, in the survey, firms report
the extent to which access to finance is an obstacle to their business operations. We then
classify those firms as financially constrained that indicate that access to finance is at least
a moderate obstacle.
The productivity threshold decreases with lower refinancing costs incurred by the bank
and increases with higher fixed costs of exporting. Firms that can charge a higher price p,
e.g., if the moral hazard problem is less severe (lower φ), can be relatively less productive to
start exporting since their expected revenues are higher.
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3.1.2 Pure CIA Financing
Next, we consider payment before delivery. If the exporter can enforce advance payment
of the total invoice before production takes place in t = 0, moral hazard and adverse selection
can be eliminated completely. Low-quality importers reveal their type by not agreeing to
pay in advance and problems related to moral hazard are irrelevant from the exporter’s point
of view. Moreover, an additional bank credit is not needed as the total costs of production
can be paid out of the revenues received up-front.
When paying the invoiced amount in advance, the importer faces refinancing costs of
(1 + r¯Im). We assume that r¯Im >> r¯B since banks are specialized financial intermediaries
and are more efficient in providing credits. We can interpret r¯Im as a measure of the financial
constraint of the importer, i.e., the higher is r¯Im, the less able is the importer to provide
CIA. Recall our assumption that the exporter has full bargaining power. Hence, with pure
CIA financing, the exporter demands a price p˜ such that the importer just breaks even:
λpˆx− p˜x(1 + r¯Im) = 0.
Consequently,
p˜ =
λpˆ
1 + r¯Im
. (6)
The exporter’s profit function with pure CIA financing is
piCIAEx = p˜x−
(
x2
2(1 + β)
+ FEx
)
. (7)
This leads to
(1 + β)CIAEx ≡
(
1 + r¯Im
λ
)2
2FEx
pˆ2
. (8)
Comparing the minimum productivity level required for pure CIA financing to the one for
pure bank credit financing, we find that pure CIA financing requires a higher minimum
productivity level if
(1 + r¯Im)(λpˆ− φ) > λpˆ(1 + r¯B)
µ
. (9)
The above condition is fulfilled if the refinancing costs of the importer are high relative to
the refinancing costs of the bank. If r¯Im is high, firms that cannot export in the case of pure
bank credit financing still cannot with pure CIA financing, either. This is due to the fact
that the higher the refinancing costs the lower the price p˜ exporters can demand for their
goods. In contrast, if the adverse selection problem is acute (low µ), pure CIA financing is
attractive for financially constrained firms because the elimination of the adverse selection
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problem is very valuable.
To simplify our presentation, in the following we restrict attention to parameter cases
where pure CIA is dominated by pure bank credit financing. This seems to be the most
relevant case since full pre-payments are very rare in practice.
3.1.3 Partial Cash in Advance and Bank Credit Financing
Consider now a combination of bank credit and CIA where only a fraction α of the
invoice payment is made in advance. This enables the importing firm to save some of the
high refinancing costs while it still allows the exporter to solve the adverse selection and the
moral hazard problem. The payment made in advance is used to pay a part of the total
production costs, the rest is financed via bank credit.
The fraction paid in advance can now serve as a signal of the importer’s quality type to
the bank and the exporter. Three cases can occur after observing a certain α: first, if the
bank believes that the importing firm is of high quality (Prob(H) = 1) it will provide an
additional bank credit at a lower interest rate to the exporting firm. Second, if the bank
believes that the importer is of low quality (Prob(H) = 0), it will not provide any bank credit
at all because the exporter is not able to repay the bank when trading with a low-quality
importer. Third, if the bank cannot infer the quality type from the amount paid in advance
(Prob(H) = µ), it will demand the same interest rate as in the case of pure bank credit
financing.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature determines the importer’s quality where Prob(H) = µ and Prob(L) = 1 − µ.
The importer learns their type.
2. In t = 0, the exporting firm specifies a price pˇ for the good to be exported and demands
CIA payment of a fraction α of the total amount from the importer. The importer
decides whether to extend the fraction α in advance or not, depending on the importer’s
type.
3. The bank observes the CIA payment by the importer in t = 0 and decides on additional
bank credit.
4. After observing the decisions made by the importer and the bank, the firm decides
whether to produce and export or not.
5. In t = 1, pay-offs are realized.
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We consider two types of equilibria in this game, separating and pooling equilibria. In a
separating equilibrium, an informative signal is given, in a pooling equilibrium the signal
sent by the importer is not informative. Proposition 1 describes the separating perfect
Bayesian equilibrium that maximizes the exporter’s pay-off.
Proposition 1 There exists a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium with[(
αH = αSep, αL = 0
)
,
(
1 + r¯B
λ
,NoBC
)
, P rob
(
H|α ≥ αSep) = 1,
P rob
(
H|0 ≤ α < αSep) = 0]
where αSep = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
−φ
λ
and the price demanded for the exported good is pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
.
In this separating equilibrium, the high-quality importer extends the share αH = αSep in
advance and the low-quality importer chooses not to extend CIA at all. When observing α =
αSep, the bank updates its belief according to Bayes Rule such that Prob
(
H|α = αSep) = 1
and extends additional bank credit at a lower interest rate, 1+r¯B
λ
. When observing α = 0, the
bank’s belief is Prob (H|α = 0) = 0 and it denies additional bank credit.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In the separating equilibrium, the exported quantity xSep and the minimum productivity
threshold for exporting (1 + β)SepEx equal:
xSepEx =
(1 + β)
1 + r¯B
[
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1 + r¯B)
(1 + r¯Im)
]
(10)
(1 + β)SepEx ≡
2(1 + r¯B)
2FEx[
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1+r¯B)
(1+r¯Im)
]2 . (11)
Firms with a productivity level lower than (1 +β)SepEx cannot export since they have negative
expected profits. As before, the productivity threshold increases with higher fixed costs and
higher bank refinancing costs. It also increases with higher importer refinancing costs and a
higher marginal benefit from diversion.
In addition, we consider the following pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There exists a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium with[
αPool,
(
1 + r¯B
λµ
)
, P rob
(
H|α = αPool) = µ, Prob (H|α < αPool) = 0, P rob (H|α > αPool) ∈ [0, 1]]
where αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
−φ
λ
and the price demanded by the exporter is pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
. In
this pooling equilibrium, both high- and low-quality importers extend the same share of CIA.
11
The bank is unable to infer the type of the importer from this signal and sticks to its ex-ante
belief, Prob (H) = µ. It extends additional bank credit at the interest rate 1+r¯B
λµ
.
Proof: See Appendix A.
For the pooling equilibrium in which αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
−φ
λ
, we can derive the following
production quantity and productivity threshold:
xPoolEx =
(1 + β)
1 + r¯B
[
µ(λpˆ− φ) + φ(1 + r¯B)
(1 + r¯Im)
]
(12)
(1 + β)PoolEx ≡
2(1 + r¯B)
2FEx[
µ(λpˆ− φ) + φ(1+r¯B)
(1+r¯Im)
]2 . (13)
Comparing the minimum productivity thresholds in the different financing scenarios, we
derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The productivity thresholds can be uniquely ranked:
(1 + β)SepEx < (1 + β)
Pool
Ex < (1 + β)
BC
Ex
Thus, we can identify four groups of firms. (1) Firms with (1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)BCEx can export
in every financing scenario. (2) Firms with (1 + β)PoolEx ≤ (1 + β) < (1 + β)BCEx can export if
CIA is given, either in the separating or the pooling equilibrium. (3) Firms with (1 + β)SepEx ≤
(1 + β) < (1 + β)PoolEx can export only in the separating equilibrium if the signal via CIA is
informative. (4) Firms with (1 + β) < (1 + β)SepEx cannot export at all.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Exβ+1
Ex
BC)1( β+ExSep)1( β+ ExPool)1( β+
(1)(2)(3)(4)
Figure 1: Ranking of productivity thresholds required for exporting
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the productivity threshold ranking for the
three different financing options.
Proposition 3 implies that if CIA financing is available, financially constrained firms in
the second and third group can export that would not have been able to do so with pure
bank financing only. These firms benefit from the availability of CIA at the extensive margin.
Firms in the fourth group cannot export even if CIA is available. Firms in the third group
depend on an informative signal that eliminates the adverse selection problem. Therefore,
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these firms play the separating perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. In contrast, firms in the second
group have a high enough productivity level to export even if the adverse selection problem
is not eliminated and can export under both equilibria. However, they cannot export with
pure bank financing only. This is due to the fact that incentives for opportunistic behavior
are stronger without CIA so that an exporter has to set a lower price for his good to prevent
moral hazard by the importer. Firms in the first group do not depend on CIA availability
since they are productive enough to export with pure bank financing only. Interestingly,
even these firms which have access to bank financing benefit from using CIA. This is shown
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Even if firms are able to export using pure bank financing, i.e. if (1 + β) ≥
(1 + β)BCEx , they prefer partial CIA financing to pure bank financing.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Very productive firms generate strictly lower expected profits with pure bank financing
than with partial CIA financing. This is due to the fact that any small amount of CIA
provided reduces the importer’s incentive to divert the good. Consequently, the exporter
can set a higher price and generate higher expected profits from partial CIA financing.
Proposition 5 Firms with (1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)PoolEx can export under both the separating and
the pooling equilibrium. They prefer to play the separating (pooling) equilibrium if quality
uncertainty is low (high) and the importer’s refinancing costs are high (low). The higher the
productivity of the firm, the greater the parameter space in which the pooling equilibrium is
preferred by the exporters.
Proof: See Appendix A.
If the importer’s refinancing costs are high, the exporter’s expected profits are higher in
the separating equilibrium since the informative signal compensates for the relatively lower
price firms receive from the importer. In contrast, expected profits are higher in the pooling
(separating) equilibrium if uncertainty is high (low). This result seems counterintuitive at
first. However, it is due to the fact that trade with an informative signal takes place with
probability µ only. With probability 1 − µ the importer is of low quality and hence not
willing to send the informative signal which means that the transaction does not take place.
An uninformative signal in a pooling equilibrium is sent by both types of importers, instead.
Therefore, firms prefer receiving at least a small (uninformative) share of CIA upfront than
receiving nothing if it is very likely that they trade with a low-quality importer (µ is low).
This effect is reinforced for more productive firms since more productive firms have lower
production costs and can better absorb losses when trading with a low-quality importer.
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Finally, we compare the exported volumes in the case of partial CIA financing to pure
bank financing and summarize our findings for the intensive margin in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 6 Exported volumes are strictly higher if firms receive CIA than if firms use
pure bank credit financing.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 6 points out that gains from using CIA occur not only at the extensive margin
but also at the intensive margin of exporting.
From these results we derive three important implications. First, the provision of CIA
by an importing trading partner can alleviate the financial constraints of an exporting firm.
Without CIA, only very productive firms are able to export, whereas with CIA provision also
less productive firms are able to do so. Second, CIA is beneficial to all firms since profits
are always higher with partial CIA financing. Therefore, all firms are expected to use a
combination of CIA and bank credit. Third, exported volumes are always higher when CIA
is provided than with pure bank financing. All in all, CIA availability fosters exporting at
the extensive and intensive margins.
3.2 Financially Constrained Importers and Supplier Credit
Consider again a two-period economy, t = 0, 1, in which a firm produces a final good and
sells it to customers in the domestic market. To produce the final good, the firm needs to
buy an intermediate good. We assume that this intermediate good is offered by a foreign
supplier (exporter) and has attractive characteristics such that the domestic firm prefers to
import the input. The final good is produced in t = 0 and revenues are generated in t = 1.
The importer faces the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
f(q1, q¯2) = x = [(1 + β) q1]
1
2 q¯
1
2
2 . (14)
To produce the quantity x of the final good, two inputs q1 and q¯2 are needed: q1 is the
quantity of the intermediate good imported from the exporter at price p1 and q¯2 is a fixed
input requirement which cannot be adjusted in the short-run and comes at cost p2. The firm’s
productivity is captured by (1 + β). From (14) we can derive the variable cost function of
the firm via cost minimization:
k(x) = p1
x2
(1 + β)q¯2
. (15)
The fixed costs of production amount to F = p2q¯2. We abstract from fixed costs of importing
because additional fixed costs simply imply level-shifts in all the results derived.
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To capture the riskiness of international transactions, we assume that the importing firm
faces uncertainty with regard to the supplier’s quality type when ordering the intermediate
good. With probability σ the exporter is a high-quality supplier and produces a high-quality
intermediate good. The high-quality exporter faces marginal costs of production of c¯. With
a high-quality input, the importer is able to produce a high-quality final good and sell it
to customers at market price pˆ. With probability 1 − σ the exporter is of low quality and
produces a low-quality input which cannot be successfully used as an input by the importer.
The low-quality exporter faces marginal costs of production of c, c < c¯. No revenues are
generated by the importer from selling a low-quality final good. We abstract from type
uncertainty with regard to the importer as this does not change our results qualitatively. We
do not consider problems related to moral hazard in this setting because adverse selection is
sufficient to create quality uncertainty with regard to the input.
We assume that the importing firm does not have any internal funds and has to pledge
for outside finance to produce the final good. Payment to the exporter can occur either
at delivery or after delivery. We normalize the exporter’s production costs c and c¯ such
that the exporter breaks even if paid these costs at delivery (including any financing of
production costs). Payment at delivery means that the importer has to pledge for a bank
credit. Payment after delivery implies that the exporter delivers the input in t = 0 but
payment of p1q1 is delayed to t = 1. We call this a supplier credit, SC. In this case, the
exporter needs to refinance at r¯Ex until payment occurs. We assume again that r¯Ex >> r¯B
for the same reasons as above and interpret r¯Ex as a measure of the financial constraint of
the exporter.
3.2.1 Pure Bank Credit Financing
If the importer pays at delivery and has to rely on pure bank credit financing his profit
function is
piBCIm = σpˆx− σ
1 + r¯B
σ
[
p1
x2
(1 + β)q¯2
+ F
]
. (16)
The bank demands a gross interest rate of 1+r¯B
σ
to break even.
Like in the previous section we assume that the firm under consideration, here the im-
porter, has full market power. Assuming a different balance of market power affects our
results only quantitatively, not qualitatively. Due to asymmetric information, the importer
cannot condition the price on the quality of the imported good. Thus, the importer has to
pay at least p1 = c¯ to make sure that the high-quality exporter breaks even.
11 The following
terms describe the optimal quantity produced of the final good, the optimal quantity im-
11If we assume that the importer does not have full market power our results do not change qualitatively.
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ported of the input, and the minimum productivity level required for importing with pure
bank credit financing:
xBCIm =
pˆ(1 + β)q¯2
2c¯
(
1+r¯B
σ
) ; qBC1 = pˆ2(1 + β)q¯2
4c¯2
(
1+r¯B
σ
)2 ; (1 + β)BCIm ≡ (1 + r¯Bσ
)2
4F c¯
pˆ2q¯2
. (17)
Like above, firms are called financially constrained if they cannot import with pure bank
credit financing.
3.2.2 Maximal Supplier Credit Financing
Instead of pure bank credit financing, the importer can ask for the extension of a SC
by the exporter over the total variable input costs (maximal SC possible). This eliminates
the adverse selection problem since low-quality exporters do not grant full SC because they
know that this supplier credit will never be repaid. However, maximal SC financing is, like
pure CIA financing, a very expensive alternative since the importer has to compensate the
exporter for the refinancing costs on the full amount of the input costs. Therefore, we restrict
attention to partial SC financing where a SC is granted on only a part of the total invoice.
This allows the importer to save on the high exporter refinancing costs while still eliminating
the adverse selection problem.
3.2.3 Partial Supplier and Bank Credit Financing
With partial SC financing, the payment of a fraction α of the total input costs p1q1 is
delayed, where 0 ≤ α < 1. The fraction granted as SC by the exporter serves as a signal of
the exporter’s quality type to the bank and the importer. The fixed costs F and (1−α)p1q1
of the variable input costs not covered by SC have to be financed via bank credit.12
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature determines the exporter’s quality: Prob(H) = σ, Prob(L) = 1 − σ. The
exporter learns their quality type.
2. In t = 0, the importer demands a SC from the exporter by choosing α and pˇ1. The
exporter decides whether to grant the fraction αpˇ1 as SC or not, depending on their
quality type.
12Usually, a SC is not granted on a fraction of the invoice but on the total invoice as described in 3.2.2.
The time span of a SC can vary, however. If the time span, e.g. 30 days, is too short for the firm to realize
revenues, additional bank credit is needed for day 30 to 60. Therefore, SC granted on a fraction of the total
invoice can also be interpreted as full SC but for a too short time period to cover all operational costs. This
again implies that a (maximal) SC extended for the total time period can be very expensive for firms.
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3. The bank observes the fraction of SC extended by the exporter in t = 0 and decides
on additional bank credit.
4. After observing the decisions made by the exporter and the bank, the firm decides
whether to import and produce or not.
5. In t = 1, pay-offs are realized.
We restrict attention to the separating equilibrium since pooling equilibria are strictly
Pareto-dominated by the separating equilibrium for financially constrained firms (See Ap-
pendix B). Proposition 7 describes the separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium that maxi-
mizes the importer’s pay-off.
Proposition 7 There exists a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
[(
αH = αSep, αL = 0
)
, ((1 + r¯B), NoBC) , P rob
(
H|α ≥ αSep) = 1,
P rob
(
H|0 ≤ α < αSep) = 0]
where αSep = (c¯−c)(1+r¯Ex)
c+(c¯−c)(1+r¯Ex) and the price paid for the imported input is pˇ1 = c+ (c¯− c)(1 +
r¯Ex). In this separating equilibrium, the high-quality exporter grants delayed payment on
the share αH = αSep and the low-quality exporter chooses not to grant delayed payment at
all. When observing α = αSep, the bank updates its belief according to Bayes Rule such that
Prob
(
H|α = αSep) = 1 and extends additional bank credit at a lower interest rate, (1 + r¯B).
When observing α = 0, the bank’s belief is Prob (H|α = 0) = 0 and it denies additional bank
credit.
Proof: See Appendix B.
In the separating equilibrium, the optimal quantity produced of the final good and the
optimal quantity imported of the intermediate good are
xSepIm =
pˆ(1 + β)q¯2
2 [(1 + r¯B)c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex)] (18)
qSep1 =
pˆ2(1 + β)q¯2
4 [(1 + r¯B)c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex)]2
. (19)
The minimum productivity level required for importing is
(1 + β)SepIm ≡
4(1 + r¯B)F [(1 + r¯B)c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex)]
pˆ2q¯2
. (20)
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Comparing the minimum productivity thresholds in both financing scenarios, we derive
the following proposition.
Proposition 8 There exists no unique ranking of the productivity thresholds (1 + β)SepIm and
(1 +β)BCIm . There exist parameter cases for which (1 +β)
Sep
Im < (1 +β)
BC
Im . This is more likely
to be the case if uncertainty is high (low σ) and the exporter refinancing costs are low.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 8 implies that financially constrained firms benefit from SC access only if
the signal sent via SC is valuable (the adverse selection problem is severe). If SC financing
is very expensive, however, financially constrained firms that cannot import with pure bank
financing cannot do so with SC financing, either. High exporter refinancing costs reflect
a higher price for the intermediate input the importer has to pay, which decreases the
importer’s profits.
Proposition 9 Consider firms with (1+β) ≥ (1+β)BCIm and (1+β) ≥ (1+β)SepIm . They can
import using either pure bank financing or partial SC financing. For very productive firms,
pure bank financing yields higher profits than partial SC financing if uncertainty is low (high
σ) and the exporter’s refinancing costs are high, and vice versa.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Very productive firms generate higher profits from using pure bank financing if the signal
sent via SC is not valuable and if SC financing is very expensive such that firms have to
pay a high price for the intermediate input. They are better off with supplier credits in the
separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium if quality uncertainty is high and if the exporter’s
refinancing costs are low.
Proposition 10 Firms import higher volumes with partial SC and bank credit financing
than with pure bank credit financing if σ and r¯Ex are low.
Proof: See Appendix B.
To sum up, partial SC financing can foster importing at the extensive and intensive
margin. This depends on whether the signal provided by SC is informative and valuable (if
the adverse selection problem is severe) and on the additional SC costs (exporter’s refinancing
costs).
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3.3 Model Predictions and Hypotheses
Both models show that trade credits can foster trade at the extensive and intensive
margins. Comparing the outcomes for partial CIA financing to partial SC financing, we find
three interesting differences:
First, CIA financing unambiguously fosters the extensive margin of exporting. There are
firms that can start exporting if they receive CIA and that would not have been able to do
so with pure bank financing. For some constrained firms even an uninformative signal is
sufficient to start exporting. In contrast, SC financing is beneficial to financially constrained
importers only if the signal via SC is valuable such that it reduces type uncertainty consider-
ably and if SC financing is not too expensive. Otherwise, financially constrained firms that
cannot import with pure bank financing cannot do so with SC financing, either.
Second, the benefits of CIA accrue not only to financially constrained firms. Even firms
that do not depend on CIA financing prefer partial CIA financing to pure bank financing. SC
financing, however, benefits mainly financially constrained importers, since very productive
importers prefer pure bank financing, depending on the parameters.
Third, for the intensive margins we find that exported volumes are always higher with
combined CIA financing, whereas with SC financing imported volumes are higher only for
the above stated conditions.
From these results we derive two hypotheses about the effects of trade credits on the
margins of exporting and importing:
Hypothesis 1
(a) Firms that receive CIA are more likely to be exporting.
(b) Exporters that receive CIA export higher volumes.
Hypothesis 2
(a) Firms that receive SC are more likely to be importing if the adverse selection problem
is severe and SC financing is not too expensive. The fostering effect of SC is particularly
strong for financially constrained firms.
(b) Importers that receive SC import higher volumes than under pure bank financing if the
adverse selection problem is severe and SC financing is not too expensive.
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4 Empirical Methodology
4.1 Data
BEEPS was developed jointly by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and the World Bank Group to analyze the business environment of firms in transition
countries and to link it with firm performance. In 2004, cross-sectional data on German
firms was collected to perform benchmark analyses. By using stratified random sampling, a
high representativeness of the sample is achieved.13 The median number of 12 employees per
firm and the median of expected sales of 1,200,000 Euro in the sample correspond quite well
to the German population averages: according to data from the Statistical Yearbook 2007
for the Federal Republic of Germany, the average number of employees was 13 and average
sales amounted to 1,230,000 Euro in Germany in 2004.
The main advantage of this dataset is that it provides precise measures of trade credit use
by firms. More specifically, firms are asked what percentage of their purchases of material
inputs or services they pay before delivery (CIA given), what percentage of these purchases
they pay late (SC received), what percentage of their own sales revenues they receive before
delivery (CIA received), and what percentage of their own sales revenues they receive late
(SC given). Thus, we do not have to rely on proxies such as trade accounts payables and trade
accounts receivables which are often used when only balance sheet data is available. However,
we cannot single out trade credit related to exporting (importing) activities compared to
domestic activities because this kind of detailed measurement is not captured in the data.
Therefore, we can only analyze the influence of overall trade credit given and received on
the extensive and intensive margin of trade.
Panel D of Table 2 provides average sample characteristics. A look at the average use of
trade credits in the sample reveals that firms use SC more intensively than CIA. On average,
firms pay 4% of their total input purchases in value terms before they receive the inputs
(CIA given). 7% of sales in value terms are received on average by firms before delivery
(CIA received). The low usage intensity may reflect there being only a few firms able to
provide others with CIA, as CIA involves high refinancing costs for the extending firms.
The mean percentages of SC given and received are considerably higher. On average 52%
of firms’ total sales in value terms are paid late by customers (SC given). In contrast, firms
13Specifically, the sample is designed so that the population composition with regard to industries, firm
size, ownership, foreign activity, and location is captured. Industries included in the sample are mining and
quarrying, construction, manufacturing, transportation, storage and communications, wholesale, retail and
repairs, real estate and business service, hotels and restaurants, and other community, social and personal
activities. Industries that are subject to government price regulation and prudential supervision like banking,
electric power, rail transport, and water and waste water are excluded.
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pay 65% of their input purchases in value terms late themselves (SC received).
The survey includes data on export shares of total sales and import shares of total
material inputs bought so that we can analyze both the exporting and importing behavior
of firms. We define a dummy variable, Exp (Imp), which is equal to one if the firm exports
(imports) a positive share of its total sales (total material inputs bought) in 2004. For the
level of exports (imports), Expvol (Impvol), we multiply the export (import) shares with
total sales (total material inputs bought) to estimate the effects on the intensive margin
of trade. In our sample, about 16% of all firms export products, 18% import inputs from
abroad. The sample averages are slightly higher than the population averages for 2004 (12%
and 13%, respectively, according to data from the Institut fu¨r Mittelstandsforschung).
We also include a measure of financial constraints on the firm-level. This enables us
to estimate different effects of trade credit use for financially constrained firms versus non-
financially constrained firms. BEEPS provides us with a direct measure of the financial
constraints experienced by firms. Specifically, firms are asked whether access to financing
is no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a moderate obstacle, or a major obstacle for the operation
and growth of their business. We classify firms as financially constrained, DFin, if access to
financing is at least a moderate obstacle to the firm. This frees us from using indirect and
imprecise measures such as cash flow or the debt ratio from firms’ balance sheets. 40% of
all firms in the sample indicate that access to financing was at least a moderate obstacle.
According to our model, the productivity level of a firm crucially determines whether a
firm is able to trade and how much to trade. We compute firm productivity, TFP , as the
residual from a regression of firm sales on firm size, input costs, and capacity utilization:
Log(Sales)i =α0 + β1Log(Size)i + β2Log(Mat)i + β3Log(Cap)i
+ β4Capacityi + i, (21)
where the subscript i refers to the firm, Size is the number of employees, Mat is the value
of material input costs, Cap is the replacement value of capital, and Capacity is the current
capacity utilization of the firm.14
14This measure of productivity is rather simple and is often criticized for not capturing the true level of
firm productivity. The standard semi-parametric approach introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996) to estimate
firm productivity consistently cannot be applied to cross-sectional data. Therefore, we carefully interpret
this measure and are aware that it delivers only an approximation of the true productivity level of a firm.
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4.2 Empirical Strategy
We use a two-part approach to test our model predictions. Thus, we analyze the effects
of trade credit on the extensive margin separately from its effects on the intensive margin.
In a first step, we explore the 0/1 decision of a firm whether to export (import) at all via
a linear probability model. This facilitates the interpretation of our results compared to a
probit estimation.15 In a second step, we only look at exporters (importers) and analyze how
trade credits affect the traded volume of these firms via an OLS regression. We estimate all
regressions with bootstrapped robust standard errors since we are using a generated regressor
(TFP ) in our estimations.
We argue that treating both stages independently is justified in our case: in our model,
only the most productive firms will be able to trade when firms face financial frictions.
Less productive or financially constrained firms are also able to trade internationally if they
receive trade credits. Therefore, when controlling for these variables we hope to capture the
main variables that influence both decisions jointly so that selection into trading is based
on observables and the error terms of both equations are not correlated.16 As a robustness
check, we assume dependence and estimate both decisions jointly via the Heckman selection
model.
4.2.1 Trade Credit Effects on the Extensive Margin of Exporting and Importing
We estimate the following linear probability model to explore the effects of trade credit
availability on the decision of a firm to export or to import.
yis = a+ β1TFPis + β2TCrecis + β3DFin+ γCis + λs + is. (22)
The dependent variables are Exp and Imp, as defined above. Our main coefficient of
interest is β2. We expect a positive influence of firm-level productivity (β1 > 0) and a
negative effect of financial constraints (β3 < 0).
TCrec measures the availability of trade credit. We expect CIA received to positively
influence Exp (Hypothesis 1a). It is measured either in percentage shares, PCIArec, or as
a dummy variable, DCIArec, equal to one if the firm receives a positive percentage share
of CIA. SC received by firms is expected to have a positive influence on Imp if quality
uncertainty is high and SC financing is not too expensive (Hypothesis 2a). SC received is
measured in percentage of total input costs paid, PSCrec, or as a dummy variable, DSCrec,
15Our main results remain unchanged when using a probit model to estimate the extensive margin.
16The two-part model is also more appealing if many zeros are observed in the participation decision, i.e.
the amount of censoring is very high (Leung and Yu (1996)). This is the case in our sample.
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equal to 1 if at least 20% of the total input costs are paid late by the firm.17 We are unable
to capture the degree of quality uncertainty and SC costs faced by firms in our sample.
Therefore, we keep in mind that Hypothesis 2a is weaker and may not hold throughout for
all firms.
In a second specification, we include an interaction term between TCrec and DFin:
yis = a+ β1TFPis + β2TCrecit + β3DFin+ β4TCrecis ∗DFinis + γCis + λs + is. (23)
This allows us to test whether trade credit availability is especially beneficial to financially
constrained firms. We expect different results for Exp and Imp. We do not expect a
significant positive effect of β4 for the exporting decision of firms. CIA fosters exports of all
firms as shown by our model and thus, CIA availability is not expected to be particularly
important for financially constrained (compared to unconstrained) firms. In contrast, we
expect a significant positive effect of SC availability for financially constrained firms at the
extensive margin of importing. In our model, financially constrained firms depend on SC
financing whereas unconstrained importers may not benefit overall from SC access and use
pure bank financing instead
As a robustness check, we replace the former interaction term with an interaction term
between trade credit received and our measure of firm productivity, TFP . Our model pre-
dicts that more productive firms are less dependent on trade credit, so that we expect trade
credit availability to become less important with increasing firm productivity. Therefore,
the interaction term is expected to have no significant influence on the extensive margin of
exporting or importing.
C contains several control variables such as the log of firms’ age, (Greenaway et al.
(2007)), current capacity utilization of the firm, i.e., the current output relative to the maxi-
mum output possible (Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2012)), the percentage of the workforce
with a university education or higher, to control for human capital effects (Bellone et al.
(2010)), and a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is influenced by competition
from foreign competitors. For Exp, we also include the markup over operating costs for the
main product, and the percentage share of SC received by the firm, PSCrec. The provision
of SC to firms from input suppliers also improves the financial situation of potential exporters
since it provides firms with extra liquidity and reduces uncertainty with regard to unknown
suppliers (see Engemann et al. (2011) for a theoretical underpinning). For Imp, we leave out
the markup of a firm since a firm’s pricing policy mainly relates to selling and not to buying
decisions. Instead, we suggest that the relationship with a firm’s main supplier influences
17Since only about 8% of all firms do not receive SC we set the threshold indicative of SC availability
higher than for CIA received.
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the importing decision of a firm. We construct a dummy variable DSudep that indicates
whether the firm is supplier dependent so that it sticks with the supplier even if the price of
the main input is raised. The sign of the variable is unclear: supplier dependent firms could
be more likely to import if they want to decrease supplier dependency from a domestic sup-
plier or they could be less likely to import if they cannot find suitable alternatives abroad.18
Industry specific effects are captured by λs.
4.2.2 Trade Credit Effects on the Intensive Margin of Exporting and Importing
The effects of trade credit on the volumes of exports and imports by firms are estimated
in two basic regressions via OLS:
Log(V olume)is = a+ β1TFPis + β2TCrecis + β3DFinis + β5TCgivis
+ γCis + λs + is (24)
Log(V olume)is = a+ β1TFPis + β2TCrecit + β3DFinis + β4TCrecis ∗DFinis
+ β5TCgivis + γCis + λs + is. (25)
The dependent variables are Log(Expvol) and Log(Impvol), respectively. We expect the
same signs for our coefficients of main interest as above. We exclude DPressure and
Workforce Univ from the control variables since both variables should only influence a
firm’s decision or ability whether to become internationally active. The volume of the in-
ternational transaction, however, is more likely to be affected by firms’ capacities and their
productivity level.
Additionally, we include TCgiv, credits given by internationally active firms to other
firms. For exporters, this is PSCgiv, the percentage of SC given out of own-sales. Exporters
that give a higher share of SC to other firms should export a higher volume since they help
other financially constrained firms to buy their products. For importers, we include a dummy
whether a positive share of CIA is given on purchases, DCIAgiv, since importers should be
able to import more if they provide other firms with CIA. One could argue that both the
volume that firms are able to trade and their capacity to extend TC themselves, could
be driven by unobserved factors, so that PSCgiv or DCIAgiv are endogenous variables.
However, how much a firm can trade and its capacity to extend TC itself should be mainly
influenced by its own productivity level and whether it is financially constrained. In our
regressions, we control for both influences, so that the endogeneity of TCgiv should not be
18Table 1 provides a detailed overview of all variables and their definitions.
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an issue. We do not face reverse causality between the exported volume and the percentage
of SC given either, since we include the percentage of SC given of total sales and not its level.
Firms with higher export volumes should have higher SC levels but should not necessarily
give a higher percentage of SC to others.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Trade Credit Effects on the Exporting Behaviour of Firms
5.1.1 Extensive Margin of Exporting
The results from estimating Equation (22) are given in Table 3, columns (1) and (2).
As expected, a higher level of TFP increases the probability of exporting. The effect is
significant in all specifications. The overall effect of CIA availability on the exporting decision
of firms is positive and significant. Firms that receive a positive share of CIA have an 8%
higher probability of exporting than firms that do not receive CIA at all (column (1)).
Likewise, if firms receive a 10 percentage point higher share of CIA, the probability of
exporting increases by 1%. These results confirm Hypothesis 1a. A similar fostering effect
can be found for SC availability.
In contrast, financially constrained firms have a 5% lower probability of exporting com-
pared to non-financially constrained firms. The previous literature on financial constraints
and exporting has been concerned with a potential endogeneity problem of the self-reported
measure of financial constraints (Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2012)). Firms that intend to
export usually have higher financing needs and therefore might more likely report financial
constraints. This may lead to a significant positive impact of DFin on the export partic-
ipation decision. We, instead, observe a significant negative influence of our measure. If
endogeneity played indeed a role, instrumenting DFin would lead to an even stronger neg-
ative impact and therefore, we consider our point estimates as very conservative estimates.
In columns (3) and (4), we include the interaction term between DFin and the corre-
sponding variable of CIA received. The interaction terms are positive but not significant.
This confirms our former guess: the positive sign implies that CIA has a fostering effect for
financially constrained firms but this effect is not statistically relevant since all firms benefit
from CIA availability. In contrast, the effect of DCIArec is positive and highly significant:
firms that are not financially constrained but receive CIA are more likely to export than com-
parable firms without CIA. Both results support our hypothesis that CIA strongly fosters
exporting of all firms at the extensive margin.
In the last two columns we provide the results for both regressions when an interaction
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term between TFP and CIA received is included. We do not find a significant influence in
either specification. This lends support to our conjecture that with an increasing productivity
level, firms do not particularly benefit from CIA provision. More productive firms have lower
variable costs and generate higher profits. Therefore, they find it easier to export and do
not depend on CIA financing.
Concerning further firm characteristics, we find that older firms and firms with a higher
capacity utilization or a higher markup are more likely to be exporters. Firms that are sub-
stantially influenced by pressure from foreign competitors when making key decisions about
developing new products or markets are also more likely to be exporters. This may mirror
the need to react to foreign competitors by becoming internationally active oneself. A higher
share of highly educated workers increases the probability of exporting which underlines the
importance of human capital.
5.1.2 Intensive Margin of Exporting
The findings in Table 4 confirm Hypothesis 1b. Firms that receive CIA have a 48%
higher export volume than firms that do not receive CIA, column (1). This effect is quite
large and shows that CIA availability has overall a tremendously fostering effect on export
volumes. Likewise, an increase in the percentage of CIA received significantly increases
export volumes, column (2). In terms of our model, this is due to (informative) signals of the
trading partner’s quality and decreased incentives for moral hazard. Interestingly, the share
of SC given, PSCgiv, has a highly significant and positive influence on the exporting volume.
This mirrors the results with regard to importers that receive SC. Firms can stimulate
demand for their exports by helping financially constrained importers to buy their products.
The coefficient of DFin is positive but not significant which seems to indicate that financial
constraints do not play a role at the intensive margin of exporting. Neither the corresponding
interaction term nor DFin has a statistically significant influence on the exported volume in
columns (3) and (4). The interaction term between CIA received and TFP is not significant,
as before.
Our findings suggest that already exporting firms seem not to be influenced by financial
constraints, thus there is no fostering effect of CIA availability for financially constrained
exporters over and above that of unconstrained exporters. However, CIA availability has
a positive influence on the exported volume for unconstrained firms which underlines the
overall beneficial effect of CIA.
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5.2 Trade Credit Effects on the Importing Behaviour of Firms
5.2.1 Extensive Margin of Importing
As in the case of the extensive margin of exporting, TFP has a significantly positive and
DFin a significantly negative influence on the decision to become an importer (Table 5).
Interestingly, the effect of SC on the import decision of firms is negative and only weakly
significant (columns (1) and (2)). This result reflects our model outcome that SC financing
does not have an overall fostering effect on importing.
Including the interaction term between SCrec and DFin we find slightly different results.
The probability of importing decreases by about 14.8% for financially constrained firms that
do not receive SC (column (3)). However, part of this negative influence can be cushioned
by SC availability by firms. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant
and almost compensates for the negative effect of financial constraints. Firms that are
financially constrained but receive SC have a 12.2% higher probability of importing than
financially constrained firms without SC. Overall, financially constrained firms with SC have
a 2.6% lower probability of importing than the base category, non-financially constrained
firms without SC (but the negative effect is smaller than for financially constrained firms
without SC). Using the percentage of SC received in column (4) leads to less precise estimates
with high standard errors.
These findings confirm Hypothesis 2a. We do not find an overall enhancing effect of
SC received for all importers. However, we find that financially constrained firms benefit
from SC access. This is in line with our model predictions that quality signals sent via SC
are especially fostering for financially constrained firms whereas unconstrained firms do not
necessarily benefit from using SC financing and may choose bank financing, instead.
In columns (5) and (6), we provide results from including an interaction term between
TFP and SC received. Both interaction terms are weakly negatively significant which indi-
cates that SC availability has a weakly negative effect on the extensive margin of importing
with increasing total factor productivity. This reflects that SC financing becomes less rele-
vant for higher-productivity firms at the extensive margin of importing.
We find a positive influence of capacity utilization, presence of foreign pressure and the
dummy that indicates supplier dependency. The last outcome may reflect supplier dependent
firms’ trying to decrease their high dependency by looking for alternative suppliers abroad.
5.2.2 Intensive Margin of Importing
The results in Table 6 confirm Hypothesis 2b. SC received has a positive and significant
influence on the import volume of firms if measured in percentage shares, column (2). We
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also include a dummy variable DCIAgiv which is equal to 1 if the firm pays a positive share
of its input purchases in advance. According to our predictions, giving CIA to others should
help exporters to sell their products abroad. Indeed, firms that give CIA have a 63% to 83%
higher import volume than firms that do not extend CIA to others. Financial constraints
do not seem to play a role at the intensive margin of importing.
The inclusion of interaction terms between SC received and DFin or TFP in columns
(3) to (6) does not result in a more differentiated picture. Since financial constraints do
not seem to be present, importers that are financially constrained but receive SC (or a
higher percentage of SC) do not significantly import higher volumes. Firms that are not
financially constrained but receive a higher share of SC import higher volumes than non-
financially constrained firms without SC. This indicates that, at the intensive margin, SC
fosters imported volumes even for unconstrained firms.
5.3 Heckman selection model
As a robustness check, we estimate both stages jointly via the Heckman selection model.
This accounts for the possibility that firms that export (import) are not selected randomly
from the population of exporters (importers). We use the dummy variable indicating that
a firm is influenced by foreign pressure when making key decisions and the share of highly
educated workforce as exclusion restrictions in the case of exporting and importing. Firms
that reveal that they are at least fairly influenced by pressure from foreign competitors when
making key decisions about developing new products or markets should be more likely to
trade internationally in order to react to foreign pressure. However, traded volumes should
be unaffected by this firm-specific attitude since volume decisions should depend mainly on
capacity and productivity. The same argument should apply to the share of highly educated
workforce employed by the firm.
We only provide the results for the first four regressions of each regression table since these
results are most relevant. Usually, the coefficients of the first stage and the selection equation
of the Heckman selection model are identical since both equations are estimated via probit. In
our case, this is not true since we estimate the first stage via a linear probability model to be
able to interpret the interaction terms. We can interpret neither the direction of the influence
nor the magnitude of the effect of the interaction terms in the selection equation without
further assumptions since the model is nonlinear (see Ai and Norton (2003)). Therefore, we
restrict our comparison to the signs and the significance for coefficients of non-interaction
terms. Table 7 shows the results in the case of exporting. Columns (1) and (2) in Table
7 correspond to column (1) of Table 4 and column (1) of Table 3, and so forth. The
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estimation results of the Heckman Selection Model are very similar to the results of the
two-part approach in terms of the direction of the influence and significance. The Mill’s
ratio is insignificant throughout all specifications. Therefore, we reject selection based on
unobservables and assume independence of both export decisions.
In Table 8 results are presented for the extensive and intensive margin of importing. In
two specifications, the Mill’s ratio is significant at the 10% level. This weakly indicates that
the decision how much to import and whether to import at all might not be independent of
each other. Therefore, a closer look at the results is required.
With regard to the signs and the significance of most variables there is no difference
between the outcomes of the two-part model and the Heckman selection model. The direction
of the influence of DSCrec is the same no matter which estimation approach is used, the
same is true for PSCrec. In the outcome equations, SC received always has a positive
influence on the imported volume while it negatively affects the probability of importing in
the selection equations. This is what we also observed in the two-part model. The only
difference is that TFP and DFin are insignificant in two selection equations, columns (2)
and (6). This is counterintuitive since according to our model, firms’ decision whether to
import or not should crucially depend on their productivity level and the extent of financial
constraints they face. We take this result and the fact that the outcome of the Heckman
selection model is very sensitive to using the correct specification and reasonable exclusion
restrictions as grounds to adhere to our preferred estimation method, the two-part approach.
6 Conclusion
Our findings lead to two major inferences. First, we confirm previous studies that fi-
nancial constraints matter in international trade. Our analysis has shown that firms are
substantially influenced by financial constraints when deciding on exporting and importing
activities. Thus, in theoretic or empiric work, it is advisable to take into account the ef-
fects of financial constraints on firms’ behavior in international trade. Second, trade credits
can help to alleviate financial constraints experienced by firms in international trade despite
higher implied costs. If external funds are not sufficiently available, firms can still overcome
financial frictions if other firms redistribute their funds in form of trade credits. Moreover,
trade credits can serve as credible signals of quality and reduce part of the high uncertainty
in international trade. Consequently, policy actions that ensure and foster trade finance and
in particular the extension of SC and CIA are highly recommendable. This is especially
relevant in a situation of global monetary contractions when firms experience difficulties in
extending trade credit.
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Figure 2: Comparison of profits in the separating and pooling equilibrium
The dyed area in the graph gives all combinations of (1 + β)Ex, µ and (1 + r¯Im) for which µpi
Sep
Ex
> piPoolEx
Parameters are set at 1 + r¯B = 1.08, FEx = 2, λ = 0.8, pˆ = 5, φ = 2.
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Figure 3: Comparison of profits from partial SC with pure bank credit financing
The shaded area in the graph gives all combinations of σ and (1 + rEx) for which (1 + β)
Sep
Im
< (1 + β)BCIm .
Parameters are set at 1 + r¯B = 1.08, c = 2, c¯ = 5.
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Table 1: Description of Variables
Variable Definition
Age Age of the firm in years
Capa Projected estimate of the replacement value of physical production
assets (in 1000 Euros)
Capacitya Current output over maximum output possible
DCIAgiv 0/1 dummy for firms that paid a positive share of their input or
services purchases before delivery
DCIArec 0/1 dummy for firms that received a positive share of their sales
before delivery
DFin 0/1 dummy for firms for which access to finance is a moderate or
major obstacle
DPressure 0/1 dummy for firms for which pressure from international competi-
tors is fairly or very important when making key decisions about
their business with regard to developing new products or services
and markets
DSCrec 0/1 dummy for firms that pay at least 20% of their input or services
purchases late to suppliers (after delivery)
DSudep 0/1 dummy for firms that continue to buy the same or slightly lower
quantities when their main supplier raises prices by 10%
Exp 0/1 dummy for firms that sell a positive share of their sales abroad
Expvol Amount of sales that are sold abroad (in 1000 Euros)
Imp 0/1 dummy for firms that buy a positive share of their material
input or services purchases abroad
Impvol Amount of material input or services purchases that are bought
abroad (in 1000 Euros)
Mata Projected estimate of material input costs and bought-in compo-
nents/services corresponding to the firm’s total sales (in 1000 Eu-
ros)
Markup Sales price divided by operating costs (in percent)
Salesa Projected estimate of total sales (in 1000 Euros)
PCIArec Percentage of sales in value terms received before the delivery of
products and services
PSCgiv Percentage of sales in value terms sold on credit (received after the
delivery of products and services)
PSCrec Percentage of purchases of material inputs or services in value terms
purchased on credit (paid after the delivery of products or services)
Sizea Number of full-time employees
TFP Total factor productivity, own calculations, see Equation (21)
Workforce Univ. Percentage of workforce that has university education or higher
All variables are measures or projected estimates of firm characteristics for the year 2004. aVariable is used to calculate total factor
productivity.
34
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Exporters vs. Non-Exporters
Exporters Non-Exporters Difference
Sales (1000 Euros) 66,971 6,419 60,552***
Number of employees 293 39 254***
Share of fin. constrained firms (%) 31.3 40.8 -9.5**
Share of firms receiving CIAa (%) 43.5 33.7 9.8**
Share of firms giving SCa (%) 93.8 79.9 13.9***
Share of firms receiving SCa (%) 96.0 91.8 4.2**
Av. Share of CIA received (%) 7.4 7.2 0.2
Av. Share of SC given (%) 64.5 49.2 15.3***
Av. Share of SC received (%) 75.4 62.7 12.7***
Panel B: Importers vs. Non-Importers
Importers Non-Importers Difference
Sales (1000 Euros) 51,152 5,945 45207***
Number of employees 233 39 194***
Share of fin. constrained firms (%) 33.5 41.2 -7.7**
Share of firms giving CIAa (%) 36.5 22.1 14.4***
Share of firms receiving SCa (%) 94.2 92.6 1.6
Av. Share of CIA given (%) 6.1 4.4 1.7
Av. Share of SC received (%) 63 65.7 -2.7
Panel C: Financially Constrained vs. Non-Financially Constrained Firms
DFin=1 DFin=0 Difference
Share of firms receiving CIAa (%) 38.5 32.3 6.2**
Share of firms receiving SCa (%) 96.3 89.7 6.6***
Av. Share of CIA received (%) 8.2 6.6 1.6*
Av. Share of SC received (%) 66.2 64.7 1.5
Panel D: Summary Statistics on Firm Characteristics
Mean Median Observations
Sales (1000 Euros) 15,862 1,200 1,135
Number of employees 86 12 1,196
Share of Exporters (%) 16 - 188
Share of Importers (%) 18 - 213
Share of CIA given (%) 4 0 1,196
Share of CIA received (%) 7 0 1,196
Share of SC given (%) 52 60 1,196
Share of SC received (%) 65 70 1,196
Share of fin. constrained firms (%) 40 - 481
Panel A and B provide results from mean difference tests of firm characteristics for exporters vs. non-exporters and importers vs. non-
importers using Welch’s formula to allow for unequal variances in both groups (Welch (1947)). Firms are defined as exporters if they sell a
positive share of their sales abroad. Firms are defined as importers if they buy a positive share of their material inputs abroad. Panel C shows
mean difference test results in trade credit use for financially constrained and non-financially constrained firms. A firm is considered to be
financially constrained if it reports that access to finance is a moderate or major obstacle to its current operations. Panel D provides average
firm characteristics. ***, **, and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. aThe share of firms that gives
or receives a certain form of trade credit is defined as all firms that give or receive a share greater than zero over all firms.
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Table 3: Trade Credit Influence on the Extensive Margin of Exporting
Exp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFP 0.0464** 0.0462** 0.0465** 0.0463** 0.0367* 0.0551***
(0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0214) (0.0209)
DCIArec 0.0764*** 0.0722*** 0.0763***
(0.0205) (0.0280) (0.0205)
PCIArec 0.00125** 0.00109 0.00145**
(0.000630) (0.000783) (0.000670)
DCIArec*DFin 0.0102
(0.0409)
PCIArec*DFin 0.000359
(0.00118)
DCIArec*TFP 0.0284
(0.0375)
PCIArec*TFP -0.001286
(0.001109)
DFin -0.0501*** -0.0474** -0.0538** -0.0500** -0.0499*** -0.0478***
(0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0224) (0.0196) (0.0187) (0.0185)
PSCrec 0.000992*** 0.000880*** 0.000992*** 0.000881*** 0.000991*** 0.000883***
(0.000284) (0.000290) (0.000275) (0.000272) (0.000285) (0.000288)
LogAge 0.0291** 0.0290** 0.0290** 0.0289** 0.0290** 0.0290**
(0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0142) (0.0141)
Markup 0.00161** 0.00177** 0.00163** 0.00178** 0.00164** 0.00179**
(0.000821) (0.000830) (0.000822) (0.000802) (0.000822) (0.000826)
Capacity 0.00320*** 0.00292*** 0.00321*** 0.00292*** 0.00319*** 0.00292***
(0.000785) (0.000777) (0.000764) (0.000768) (0.000784) (0.000779)
DPressure 0.221*** 0.223*** 0.221*** 0.223*** 0.222*** 0.222***
(0.0262) (0.0265) (0.0258) (0.0257) (0.0262) (0.0264)
Workforce Univ. 0.00127** 0.00139*** 0.00127** 0.00139** 0.00125*** 0.00140***
(0.000538) (0.000536) (0.000551) (0.000546) (0.000541) (0.000536)
Indus. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078 1,078
R-squared 0.329 0.322 0.329 0.322 0.319 0.323
This table reports the estimated coefficients of various influences on firms’ export decision via a linear probability model. The dependent variable is an
export decision dummy which is equal to 1 if the firm exported a positive amount in 2004. Columns (1) to (2) present results for the basic regression
when CIA received is either measured as dummy or share variable. In columns (3) and (4) interaction terms between the CIA variables and the financial
constraints dummy are included, in columns (5) and (6) the same is done for interactions between CIA received and TFP. For the definitions of the
independent variables please refer to Table 1. Industry fixed effects are included with respect to all relevant industries. Bootstrapped robust standard
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Trade Credit Influence on the Intensive Margin of Exporting
LogExpvol
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFP 1.852*** 1.885*** 1.827*** 1.877*** 1.939*** 1.785***
(0.289) (0.286) (0.309) (0.311) (0.419) (0.337)
DCIArec 0.479* 0.607* 0.476*
(0.268) (0.325) (0.272)
PCIArec 0.0272*** 0.0297** 0.0275***
(0.00892) (0.0126) (0.00927)
DCIArec*DFin -0.436
(0.557)
PCIArec*DFin -0.00636
(0.0158)
DCIArec*TFP -0.191
(0.566)
PCIArec*TFP 0.0142
(0.0253)
DFin 0.183 0.124 0.374 0.175 0.170 0.154
(0.284) (0.288) (0.427) (0.369) (0.284) (0.290)
PSCrec -0.00205 -0.00301 -0.00190 -0.00312 -0.00191 -0.00332
(0.00645) (0.00633) (0.00617) (0.00591) (0.00650) (0.00623)
PSCgiv 0.0185*** 0.0207*** 0.0181*** 0.0208*** 0.0181*** 0.0213***
(0.00561) (0.00566) (0.00628) (0.00634) (0.00551) (0.00549)
LogAge 1.145*** 1.130*** 1.143*** 1.129*** 1.143*** 1.127***
(0.182) (0.164) (0.192) (0.172) (0.186) (0.169)
Markup -0.00832 -0.0108 -0.00794 -0.0110 -0.00854 -0.0116
(0.0125) (0.0121) (0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0125)
Capacity 0.0413*** 0.0404** 0.0406** 0.0407** 0.0415** 0.0410***
(0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0168) (0.0165) (0.0161) (0.0158)
Indus. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165
R-squared 0.516 0.529 0.518 0.529 0.516 0.530
This table reports the estimated coefficients of an OLS regression of the log of export volume. Export volumes are calculated as the share of exports
of total sales times the value of total sales in 2004. Columns (1) to (2) present results for the basic regression when CIA received is either measured
as dummy or share variable. In columns (3) and (4) interaction terms between the CIA variables and the financial constraints dummy are included,
in columns (5) and (6) the same is done for interactions between CIA received and TFP. For the definitions of the independent variables please refer
to Table 1. Industry fixed effects cannot be included due to data limitations. Bootstrapped robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Trade Credit Influence on the Extensive Margin of Importing, LPM
Imp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFP 0.0469* 0.0500** 0.0445* 0.0503** 0.137*** 0.113***
(0.0250) (0.0253) (0.0250) (0.0252) (0.0515) (0.0434)
DSCrec -0.0598* -0.0994** -0.0641*
(0.0329) (0.0406) (0.0331)
PSCrec -0.000598* -0.000558 -0.000605*
(0.000337) (0.000397) (0.000337)
DSCrec*DFin 0.122*
(0.0673)
PSCrec*DFin -0.000121
(0.000656)
DSCrec*TFP -0.105*
(0.0541)
PSCrec*TFP -0.000955*
(0.000540)
DFin -0.0401* -0.0425** -0.148** -0.0346 -0.0387* -0.0410**
(0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0644) (0.0501) (0.0208) (0.0209)
LogAge 0.0103 0.0119 0.00982 0.0120 0.0103 0.0120
(0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0155)
Capacity 0.00196** 0.00198** 0.00198** 0.00198** 0.00189** 0.00197**
(0.000859) (0.000866) (0.000857) (0.000865) (0.000862) (0.000867)
DPressure 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.187*** 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.185***
(0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0294) (0.0292) (0.0291)
DSudep 0.0646*** 0.0643*** 0.0651*** 0.0643*** 0.0661*** 0.0648***
(0.0234) (0.0232) (0.0235) (0.0232) (0.0234) (0.0231)
Workforce Univ. -0.000120 -8.53e-05 -5.42e-05 -9.43e-05 -0.000149 -8.80e-05
(0.000499) (0.000495) (0.000498) (0.000500) (0.000510) (0.000501)
Indus. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093
R-squared 0.145 0.145 0.147 0.145 0.148 0.147
This table reports the estimated coefficients of various influences on firms’ import decision via a linear probability model. The dependent variable
is an import decision dummy which is equal to 1 if the firm directly imported a positive amount of its inputs in 2004. Columns (1) to (2) present
results for the basic regression when SC received is either measured as dummy or share variable. In columns (3) and (4) interaction terms between
the SC variables and the financial constraints dummy are included, in columns (5) and (6) the same is done for interactions between SC received and
TFP. For the definitions of the independent variables please refer to Table 1. Industry fixed effects are included with respect to all relevant industries.
Bootstrapped robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Trade Credit Influence on the Intensive Margin of Importing
LogImpvol
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFP 2.115*** 2.081*** 2.108*** 2.041*** 1.872 1.472
(0.358) (0.355) (0.357) (0.346) (1.560) (0.979)
DSCrec 0.565 0.500 0.549
(0.414) (0.489) (0.402)
PSCrec 0.0119** 0.00986* 0.0113**
(0.00468) (0.00553) (0.00452)
DSCrec*DFin 0.338
(1.059)
PSCrec*DFin 0.00778
(0.00941)
DSCrec*TFP 0.272
(1.591)
PSCrec*TFP 0.00870
(0.0124)
DFin 0.0219 0.107 -0.286 -0.408 0.0175 0.0694
(0.380) (0.370) (0.992) (0.685) (0.383) (0.372)
DCIAgiv 0.629* 0.833** 0.631* 0.808** 0.621* 0.783**
(0.328) (0.347) (0.332) (0.352) (0.330) (0.351)
LogAge 1.043*** 1.001*** 1.042*** 0.987*** 1.043*** 0.982***
(0.244) (0.236) (0.246) (0.242) (0.244) (0.243)
Capacity 0.0336** 0.0337** 0.0335** 0.0339** 0.0333* 0.0338**
(0.0170) (0.0165) (0.0171) (0.0165) (0.0173) (0.0165)
DSudep -0.205 -0.0413 -0.210 -0.0573 -0.200 -0.0479
(0.293) (0.299) (0.297) (0.301) (0.301) (0.299)
Indus. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184
R-squared 0.438 0.453 0.438 0.455 0.438 0.456
This table reports the estimated coefficients of an OLS regression of the log of import volumes. Import volumes are calculated as the share of imports
of total inputs bought times the value of total inputs bought in 2004. Columns (1) to (2) present results for the basic regression when SC received is
either measured as dummy or share variable. In columns (3) and (4) interaction terms between the SC variables and the financial constraints dummy
are included, in columns (5) and (6) the same is done for interactions between SC received and TFP. For the definitions of the independent variables
please refer to Table 1. Industry fixed effects are included. Bootstrapped robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance
at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
39
T
ab
le
7:
H
ec
k
m
an
S
el
ec
ti
on
M
o
d
el
-
T
ra
d
e
C
re
d
it
E
ff
ec
ts
on
th
e
E
x
p
or
ti
n
g
B
eh
av
io
u
r
of
F
ir
m
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
O
ut
co
m
e
Se
le
ct
io
n
O
ut
co
m
e
Se
le
ct
io
n
O
ut
co
m
e
Se
le
ct
io
n
O
ut
co
m
e
Se
le
ct
io
n
T
F
P
1.
80
2*
**
0.
37
8*
**
1.
85
0*
**
0.
36
6*
**
1.
76
7*
**
0.
37
8*
**
1.
83
8*
**
0.
36
6*
**
(0
.3
02
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.3
05
)
(0
.1
40
)
(0
.3
00
)
(0
.1
41
)
(0
.3
07
)
(0
.1
40
)
D
C
IA
re
c
0.
39
2
0.
53
6*
**
0.
52
6
0.
52
2*
**
(0
.3
78
)
(0
.1
43
)
(0
.3
91
)
(0
.1
59
)
P
C
IA
re
c
0.
02
61
**
0.
00
77
9*
*
0.
02
90
*
0.
00
78
1
(0
.0
12
5)
(0
.0
03
75
)
(0
.0
15
0)
(0
.0
04
81
)
D
C
IA
re
c*
D
F
in
-0
.4
99
0.
03
59
(0
.5
88
)
(0
.2
67
)
P
C
IA
re
c*
D
F
in
-0
.0
07
63
-6
.1
0e
-0
5
(0
.0
21
5)
(0
.0
07
84
)
D
F
in
0.
21
5
-0
.2
37
*
0.
15
0
-0
.2
46
*
0.
43
8
-0
.2
52
0.
21
3
-0
.2
46
(0
.2
95
)
(0
.1
38
)
(0
.2
93
)
(0
.1
37
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.1
81
)
(0
.3
60
)
(0
.1
51
)
P
SC
re
c
-0
.0
02
48
0.
00
77
4*
**
-0
.0
03
15
0.
00
67
1*
**
-0
.0
02
37
0.
00
77
3*
**
-0
.0
03
30
0.
00
67
1*
**
(0
.0
06
69
)
(0
.0
02
05
)
(0
.0
06
57
)
(0
.0
02
01
)
(0
.0
06
80
)
(0
.0
02
05
)
(0
.0
06
77
)
(0
.0
02
02
)
P
SC
gi
v
0.
01
77
**
*
0.
02
01
**
*
0.
01
72
**
*
0.
02
02
**
*
(0
.0
05
90
)
(0
.0
06
00
)
(0
.0
05
96
)
(0
.0
06
05
)
L
og
A
ge
1.
11
4*
**
0.
14
9
1.
11
1*
**
0.
11
9
1.
10
8*
**
0.
14
8
1.
10
8*
**
0.
11
9
(0
.1
96
)
(0
.0
93
3)
(0
.1
82
)
(0
.0
89
4)
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.0
94
4)
(0
.1
83
)
(0
.0
89
8)
M
ar
ku
p
-0
.0
10
7
0.
00
90
7*
-0
.0
12
7
0.
01
03
**
-0
.0
10
6
0.
00
91
1*
-0
.0
13
1
0.
01
03
**
(0
.0
14
1)
(0
.0
05
27
)
(0
.0
13
6)
(0
.0
05
21
)
(0
.0
14
1)
(0
.0
05
33
)
(0
.0
13
6)
(0
.0
05
22
)
C
ap
ac
it
y
0.
03
63
*
0.
02
58
**
*
0.
03
70
**
0.
02
32
**
*
0.
03
49
*
0.
02
58
**
*
0.
03
71
**
0.
02
32
**
*
(0
.0
19
5)
(0
.0
07
19
)
(0
.0
18
6)
(0
.0
06
68
)
(0
.0
19
5)
(0
.0
07
18
)
(0
.0
18
7)
(0
.0
06
68
)
D
P
re
ss
ur
e
1.
08
9*
**
1.
08
0*
**
1.
08
9*
**
1.
08
0*
**
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.1
25
)
(0
.1
25
)
W
or
kf
or
ce
U
ni
v.
0.
00
93
5*
**
0.
00
99
2*
**
0.
00
93
3*
**
0.
00
99
3*
**
(0
.0
03
61
)
(0
.0
03
46
)
(0
.0
03
61
)
(0
.0
03
46
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
1,
07
8
1,
07
8
1,
07
8
1,
07
8
1,
07
8
1,
07
8
1,
07
8
1,
07
8
C
en
so
re
d
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
91
3
91
3
91
3
91
3
91
3
91
3
91
3
91
3
M
ill
’s
R
at
io
-0
.2
78
-0
.2
08
-0
.3
16
-0
.2
25
(0
.3
88
)
(0
.3
80
)
(0
.3
95
)
(0
.3
84
)
ρ
-0
.1
73
-0
.1
32
-0
.1
96
-0
.1
42
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
e
st
im
a
te
d
c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
ts
o
f
e
st
im
a
ti
n
g
fi
rm
d
e
c
is
io
n
s
m
a
d
e
a
t
th
e
e
x
te
n
si
v
e
a
n
d
in
te
n
si
v
e
m
a
rg
in
o
f
e
x
p
o
rt
in
g
jo
in
tl
y
v
ia
th
e
tw
o
-s
te
p
H
e
c
k
m
a
n
se
le
c
ti
o
n
m
o
d
e
l.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
th
e
lo
g
o
f
e
x
p
o
rt
e
d
v
o
lu
m
e
s
in
2
0
0
4
.
In
d
u
st
ry
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
ts
a
re
in
c
lu
d
e
d
.
B
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
p
e
d
ro
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
a
re
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
d
e
n
o
te
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
0
.0
1
,
0
.0
5
,
a
n
d
0
.1
0
le
v
e
ls
,
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
ly
.
40
T
ab
le
8:
H
ec
k
m
an
S
el
ec
ti
on
M
o
d
el
-
T
ra
d
e
C
re
d
it
E
ff
ec
ts
on
th
e
Im
p
or
ti
n
g
B
eh
av
io
u
r
of
F
ir
m
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
O
ut
co
m
e
Se
le
ct
io
n
O
ut
co
m
e
Se
le
ct
io
n
O
ut
co
m
e
Se
le
ct
io
n
O
ut
co
m
e
Se
le
ct
io
n
T
F
P
1.
88
4*
**
0.
20
3
1.
87
8*
**
0.
22
0*
1.
89
1*
**
0.
19
4
1.
83
0*
**
0.
22
6*
(0
.3
92
)
(0
.1
27
)
(0
.3
80
)
(0
.1
29
)
(0
.3
87
)
(0
.1
27
)
(0
.3
70
)
(0
.1
28
)
L
og
A
ge
0.
98
7*
**
0.
03
16
0.
95
3*
**
0.
04
04
0.
99
0*
**
0.
02
89
0.
93
6*
**
0.
04
25
(0
.2
47
)
(0
.0
71
7)
(0
.2
43
)
(0
.0
71
8)
(0
.2
46
)
(0
.0
71
2)
(0
.2
46
)
(0
.0
72
0)
C
ap
ac
it
y
0.
02
34
0.
00
89
5*
0.
02
50
0.
00
90
8*
0.
02
36
0.
00
89
5*
0.
02
50
0.
00
90
7*
(0
.0
18
0)
(0
.0
04
85
)
(0
.0
17
2)
(0
.0
04
91
)
(0
.0
18
1)
(0
.0
04
84
)
(0
.0
17
3)
(0
.0
04
92
)
D
P
re
ss
ur
e
0.
72
0*
**
0.
72
3*
**
0.
72
7*
**
0.
71
9*
**
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.1
12
)
(0
.1
12
)
D
Su
de
p
-0
.3
67
0.
30
0*
**
-0
.1
94
0.
29
0*
**
-0
.3
69
0.
30
1*
**
-0
.2
13
0.
29
1*
**
(0
.3
44
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.3
55
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.3
44
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.3
56
)
(0
.1
03
)
W
or
kf
or
ce
U
ni
v.
-0
.0
01
13
-0
.0
01
08
-0
.0
00
85
0
-0
.0
01
19
(0
.0
03
53
)
(0
.0
03
54
)
(0
.0
03
55
)
(0
.0
03
57
)
D
SC
re
c
0.
68
4
-0
.2
76
**
0.
72
6
-0
.4
11
**
*
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.1
41
)
(0
.4
57
)
(0
.1
58
)
P
SC
re
c
0.
01
22
**
-0
.0
02
89
*
0.
00
97
9*
-0
.0
02
34
(0
.0
05
16
)
(0
.0
01
53
)
(0
.0
05
42
)
(0
.0
01
73
)
D
SC
re
c*
D
F
in
-0
.0
83
7
0.
47
7
(1
.2
59
)
(0
.3
68
)
P
SC
re
c*
D
F
in
0.
00
93
1
-0
.0
01
81
(0
.0
10
5)
(0
.0
03
13
)
D
F
in
0.
09
12
-0
.1
54
0.
16
1
-0
.1
71
0.
15
2
-0
.5
75
-0
.4
51
-0
.0
55
9
(0
.3
80
)
(0
.1
07
)
(0
.3
61
)
(0
.1
07
)
(1
.2
48
)
(0
.3
54
)
(0
.7
67
)
(0
.2
35
)
D
C
IA
gi
v
0.
57
7*
0.
76
0*
*
0.
58
1*
0.
73
4*
*
(0
.3
02
)
(0
.3
29
)
(0
.3
05
)
(0
.3
28
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
1,
09
3
1,
09
3
1,
09
3
1,
09
3
1,
09
3
1,
09
3
1,
09
3
1,
09
3
C
en
so
re
d
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
90
9
90
9
90
9
90
9
90
9
90
9
90
9
90
9
M
ill
’s
R
at
io
-1
.2
10
*
-1
.0
26
-1
.1
82
*
-1
.0
40
(0
.6
61
)
(0
.6
52
)
(0
.6
54
)
(0
.6
62
)
ρ
-0
.5
62
-0
.4
96
-0
.5
52
-0
.5
03
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
e
st
im
a
te
d
c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
ts
o
f
e
st
im
a
ti
n
g
fi
rm
d
e
c
is
io
n
s
m
a
d
e
a
t
th
e
e
x
te
n
si
v
e
a
n
d
in
te
n
si
v
e
m
a
rg
in
o
f
im
p
o
rt
in
g
jo
in
tl
y
v
ia
th
e
tw
o
-s
te
p
H
e
c
k
m
a
n
se
le
c
ti
o
n
m
o
d
e
l.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
th
e
lo
g
o
f
im
p
o
rt
e
d
v
o
lu
m
e
s
in
2
0
0
4
.
In
d
u
st
ry
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
ts
a
re
in
c
lu
d
e
d
.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
a
re
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
d
e
n
o
te
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
0
.0
1
,
0
.0
5
,
a
n
d
0
.1
0
le
v
e
ls
,
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
ly
.
41
Appendix
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION
A CIA and Financially Constrained Exporters
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the strategies and beliefs specified in Proposition 1. For these strategies and
beliefs to form a separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the following conditions have to
hold. Recall that pˇ denotes the price the exporter demands for the good.
(1) λpˆx− αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αH)pˇx ≥ 0
(2) − αLpˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx ≥ 0
(3) λpˆx− αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αH)pˇx ≥ λpˆx− αLpˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αL)pˇx
(4) − αLpˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx ≥ −αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx
(5) λpˆx− αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αH)pˇx ≥ −αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx.
Conditions (1) and (2) describe the participation constraints of the high- and the low-quality
importer when extending the share α of the purchasing price pˇx in advance. Conditions (3)
and (4) are the corresponding incentive compatibility constraints of both types. Condition
(5) rules out moral hazard by the high-quality importer guaranteeing that the high-quality
importer breaks even when paying an informative amount of CIA. It is easily verified that
by choosing
αH = αSep =
φ/(1 + r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
− φ
λ
, αL = 0, and pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+
φ
(1 + r¯Im)
,
all five conditions are fulfilled in such a way that the exporter’s pay-off is maximized.
If the bank observes the share α = αSep given in advance it updates its belief according to
Bayes Rule such that Prob(H|αSep) = 1 and extends additional bank credit at the cheaper
interest rate (1+r¯B)
λ
. If α ≤ αSep the bank’s best response is to deny bank credit, as otherwise
piB < 0 because its updated belief is that it faces the low-quality importer.
The high-quality importer’s best response is to choose αH = αSep and the low-quality
importer’s best response is to set αL = 0. The high-quality importer does not devi-
ate to 0 ≤ α < αSep since the bank does not extend any bank credit in this case,
Prob
(
H|0 ≤ α < αSep) = 0. Thus, the export transaction does not take place and the
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high-quality importer pays the amount of CIA in vain, i.e., piHIm ≤ 0. The high-quality type
does not have an incentive to set α > αSep, because given pˇ and xSepEx , the importer makes
negative profits when extending a higher amount of CIA. Hence, the high-quality importer
does not have an incentive to deviate from αSep.
The low-quality importer does not have an incentive to choose 0 < αL < αSep, since the
bank does not extend an additional bank credit in this case and piLIm ≤ 0. Neither does it
choose αL ≥ αSep since piLIm ≤ 0, as well.
Derivation of xSepEx and (1 + β)
Sep
Ex
In the separating equilibrium, the exporter’s profit function with partial CIA and bank
credit financing is
piSepEx = α
Seppˇx+ λ(1− αSep)pˇx− λ(1 + r¯B)
λ
(
x2
2(1 + β)
+ FEx − αSeppˇx
)
− αSeppˇx. (26)
Part of the total invoice amount is received with certainty up-front, the rest is received with
probability λ in t = 1. The amount paid in advance is used to pay a part of the total costs of
production, the rest is financed via bank credit. Bank credit is available at a lower interest
rate since uncertainty with regard to the importer’s quality type has vanished.
Combining αSep = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
−φ
λ
and pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
to maximize the exporter’s profit
given in (26), we can derive the optimal quantity exported and the minimum productivity
level necessary for exporting:
xSepEx =
(1 + β)
1 + r¯B
[
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1 + r¯B)
(1 + r¯Im)
]
(1 + β)SepEx ≡
2(1 + r¯B)
2FEx[
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1+r¯B)
(1+r¯Im)
]2 .
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the strategies and beliefs specified in Proposition 2. It is easily verified that with
the share αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
−φ
λ
and pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
the participation constraints and the
incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied for both types of importers and the pay-off
of the exporter is maximized. Note that only for αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
−φ
λ
and pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
the exporter can set the profits of both importer types equal to 0.
Neither type of importer has an incentive to deviate from αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ
(1+r¯Im)
−φ
λ
. They
will not deviate to α > αPool since, given the price pˇ for the exporter’s good, importer
profits decrease in α. Furthermore, they will not unilaterally decrease α as the transaction
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will not take place then. This holds independently for any equilibrium belief of the bank,
Prob
(
H|α > αPool) ∈ [0, 1] since pˇ is given. For Prob (H|α > αPool) = 1, the bank offers
the cheaper bank credit to the exporter. However, the exporter will charge the same price
and thus the high-quality type does not have an incentive to deviate to αH > αPool. For
Prob
(
H|α > αPool) = 0, the bank does not extend any bank credit and the transaction
does not take place. For every belief Prob
(
H|α > αPool) ∈ [0, 1], the exporter will charge
the same price. Hence, neither the high-quality importer nor the low-quality importer has
an incentive to deviate to αH > αPool.
Derivation of xPoolEx and (1 + β)
Pool
Ex
In the pooling equilibrium with αPool = αSep, the bank has the belief Prob(H|αPool) = µ
and (1 + rB) =
(1+r¯B)
λµ
. The price for the export good is given by pˇ. The exporter’s profit
function with partial CIA and bank credit financing is
piPoolEx = α
Poolpˇx+λµ(1−αPool)pˇx−λµ(1 + r¯B)
λµ
(
x2
2(1 + β)
+ FEx − αPoolpˇx
)
−αPoolpˇx. (27)
The optimal quantity exported and the minimum productivity level required for exporting
are
xPoolEx =
(1 + β)
1 + r¯B
[
µ(λpˆ− φ) + φ(1 + r¯B)
(1 + r¯Im)
]
(1 + β)PoolEx ≡
2(1 + r¯B)
2FEx[
µ(λpˆ− φ) + φ(1+r¯B)
(1+r¯Im)
]2 .
Proof of Proposition 3
A comparison of (11) with (13), reveals that (1 + β)SepEx < (1 + β)
Pool
Ex since µ < 1. Simi-
larly, from comparing (13) with (5) we find that (1 + β)PoolEx < (1 + β)
BC
Ex since 0 <
φ(1+r¯B)
(1+r¯Im)
.
Therefore,
(1 + β)SepEx < (1 + β)
Pool
Ex < (1 + β)
BC
Ex .
Proof of Proposition 4
Firms in the first category can export with pure bank credit financing or combined CIA
financing. Partial CIA financing allows the exporter to charge a higher price than in the
case of pure bank financing. It is straightforward to see that
p < pˇ.
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A higher price leads to higher expected revenues and higher expected profits since the total
costs of production remain constant.
Consider, e.g., the case of partial CIA financing in the pooling equilibrium. The exporter
faces the same type uncertainty as with pure bank financing and pays the same bank
interest rate. However, the exporter receives a higher price from partial CIA financing and
therefore makes higher profits than with pure bank financing.
Proof of Proposition 5
Whether exporters with (1 +β) ≥ (1 +β)PoolEx prefer to play the pooling or the separating
equilibrium depends on the expected profits in both equilibria. A transaction with an infor-
mative signal in the separating equilibrium occurs with probability µ since with probability
1− µ the importer is of low quality and is not willing to extend an informative signal. Thus
expected profits in the separating equilibrium amount to µpiSepEx . A transaction with an un-
informative signal in the pooling equilibrium always takes place since every importer type is
able to provide the uninformative fraction of CIA. Exporting firms in the first and second
group receive a higher payoff in a separating equilibrium if
µpiSepEx > pi
Pool
Ex .
This is fulfilled if
2 (1− µ) (1 + r¯B)2FEx > (1 + β)
[[
µ (λpˆ− φ) + φ 1 + r¯B
1 + r¯Im
]2
− µ
[
λpˆ− φ+ φ 1 + r¯B
1 + r¯Im
]2]
. (28)
For given values of (1 + β) and µ, (28) holds if
1 + r¯Im > ±
√√√√ φ2(1 + r¯B)2
2(1+r¯B)2FEx
(1+β)
+ µ (λpˆ− φ)
.
We can rule out the negative value since (1 + r¯Im) ∈ [1,∞). Thus, there exists a unique
threshold of (1 + r¯Im).
For given values of (1 + β) and (1 + r¯Im), (28) holds if
µ >
(1 + r¯B)2(1 + β)φ2 − 2FEx(1 + r¯B)2(1 + r¯Im)2
(1 + r¯Im)2(1 + β)(−pˆλ+ φ)2 .
Consequently, these exporters prefer playing the separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium
if quality uncertainty is low (high µ) and the importer’s refinancing costs are high. They
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prefer playing the pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium if quality uncertainty is high (low µ)
and the importer’s refinancing costs are low.
Note further that for given values of µ and (1 + r¯Im), (28) holds if
(1 + β) <
2 (1− µ) (1 + r¯B)2FEx[[
µ (λpˆ− φ) + φ 1+r¯B
1+r¯Im
]2
− µ
[
λpˆ− φ+ φ 1+r¯B
1+r¯Im
]2] .
Thus, the pooling equilibrium becomes more preferable, the higher is the productivity of the
firm.
Figure 2 depicts the comparison of expected profits in both equilibria for different
values of (1 + β), µ, and (1 + r¯Im). The pooling equilibrium yields higher profits than the
separating equilibrium in parameter spaces with low values of µ and (1 + r¯Im). This effect
is reinforced for more productive firms (higher β).
Proof of Proposition 6
Comparing (4) with (10) and (12), it is straightforward to see that the following relation-
ship holds:
xSepEx > x
Pool
Ex > x
BC
Ex .
Therefore, the exported volume is strictly higher if firms use a combination of CIA and bank
credit financing compared to pure bank credit financing.
B Supplier Credit and Financially Constrained Im-
porters
Proof of Proposition 7
Consider the strategies and beliefs specified in Proposition 7. For these strategies and
beliefs to form a separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the following conditions have to
hold. Recall that pˇ1 denotes the price the importer pays for the imported input.
(1) αH pˇ1q1 −
[
c¯q1 − (1− αH)pˇ1q1
]
(1 + r¯Ex) ≥ 0
(2) − [cq1 − (1− αL)pˇ1q1] (1 + r¯Ex) ≥ 0
(3) αH pˇ1q1 −
[
c¯q1 − (1− αH)pˇ1q1
]
(1 + r¯Ex) ≥ αLpˇ1q1 −
[
c¯q1 − (1− αL)pˇ1q1
]
(1 + r¯Ex)
(4) − [cq1 − (1− αL)pˇ1q1] (1 + r¯Ex) ≥ − [cq1 − (1− αH)pˇ1q1] (1 + r¯Ex).
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The first and second condition are the participation constraints of the high- and low-quality
exporter. The high-quality exporter is repaid the SC of αH pˇ1q1 by the importer since final
good revenues are generated. The fraction (1 − αH) of pˇ1q1 is received upfront to pay a
part of the production costs c¯q1. c¯q1 − (1− αH)pˇ1q1 has to be self-financed by the exporter
at the refinancing costs r¯Ex. The low-quality exporter receives payment of (1 − αL)pˇ1q1 of
the input costs upfront and pays c per unit produced of the low-quality intermediate good.
The low-quality exporter is not repaid the SC extended, αLpˇ1q1, since the importer is not
able to generate revenues. The third and fourth condition give the incentive compatibility
constraints of both types, respectively. It is easily verified that by choosing
αH = αSep ≡ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex)
c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex) , α
L = 0, and pˇ1 = c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex)
all four conditions are fulfilled and the importer’s pay-off is maximized.
The high-quality exporter sets αH = αSep and the low-quality exporter chooses a SC of
αL = 0. Both exporters do not have an incentive to deviate from their choices. The high-
quality type does not set 0 ≤ αH < αSep, since the bank does not provide additional bank
credit in this case and the transaction does not take place, piHEx ≤ 0. Likewise, the high-
quality exporter does not choose αH > αSep because at a given quantity, higher refinancing
costs for a higher amount of SC extended are not compensated for by a higher price p1. The
low-quality exporter does not choose αL > 0, since piLEx < 0.
The bank updates its belief according to Bayes Rule such that Prob
(
H|αSep) = 1. If
α = 0 the bank’s best response is to deny bank credit, as otherwise piB < 0. The bank
cannot increase its profits by choosing a higher interest rate due to perfect competition.
Derivation of xSepIm , q
Sep
1 , and (1 + β)
Sep
Im
The importer’s profit function with partial SC and bank credit financing in the separating
case is
piSepIm = pˆx−
[
(1− αSep)pˇ1(1 + r¯B) + αSeppˇ1
] x2
(1 + β)q¯2
− (1 + r¯B)F. (29)
Using αSep ≡ (c¯−c)(1+r¯Ex)
c+(c¯−c)(1+r¯Ex) and pˇ1 = c + (c¯ − c)(1 + r¯Ex) to maximize the importer’s profit
given in (29), we derive the optimal quantity produced of the final good and the optimal
quantity imported of the intermediate good as
xSepIm =
pˆ(1 + β)q¯2
2 [(1 + r¯B)c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex)]
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qSep1 =
pˆ2(1 + β)q¯2
4 [(1 + r¯B)c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex)]2
.
The minimum productivity level required for importing when producing xSepIm is
(1 + β)SepIm ≡
4(1 + r¯B)F [(1 + r¯B)c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex)]
pˆ2q¯2
.
Proof of Proposition 8
Comparing (20) with (17) we find that (1 + β)SepIm < (1 + β)
BC
Im only if
(1 + r¯B)c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex) < 1 + r¯B
σ2
c¯. (30)
For a given σ 30 is fulfilled if
(1 + r¯Ex) <
1+r¯B
σ2
c¯− (1 + r¯B)c
(c¯− c) .
For a given 1 + r¯Ex 30 is fulfilled if
σ < ±
√
(1 + r¯B)2c¯
(1 + r¯B)c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex) .
We can rule out the negative value since σ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, there exists a unique threshold of
σ.
Therefore, partial SC financing leads to a lower productivity threshold than pure bank
financing if (1 + r¯Ex) is not too high and if σ is rather low (the signal sent via SC is not
trivial). This is also illustrated in Figure 3.
If these conditions hold, firms with (1 + β)SepIm ≤ (1 + β) < (1 + β)BCIm can import when
receiving an informative signal via SC and play the unique separating perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
Exclusion of Pooling equilibria
The bank has the belief Prob(H|α ≤ αPool) = σ and the off-equilibrium belief is free,
Prob
(
H|α > αPool) ∈ [0, 1]. It chooses (1 + rB) = 1+r¯Bσ . Again, we consider the case in
which αPool = αSep = (c¯−c)(1+r¯Ex)
c+(c¯−c)(1+r¯Ex) and the input price paid by the importer is given by
pˇ1 = c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex) as the profits of both types of exporters are set to 0 then.
If an uninformative signal is given, type uncertainty is not eliminated and the importer’s
48
profit function is
piPoolIm = σpˆx−
[
σ(1− αPool)pˇ1 (1 + r¯B)
σ
+ σαPoolpˇ1
]
x2
(1 + β)q¯2
− σ (1 + r¯B)
σ
F. (31)
The quantity produced of the final good, the imported quantity of the input, and the mini-
mum productivity level required for importing are
xPoolIm =
σpˆ(1 + β)q¯2
2 [(1 + r¯B)c+ σ(c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex)] (32)
qPool1 =
(σpˆ)2(1 + β)q¯2
4 [(1 + r¯B)c+ σ(c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex)]2
(33)
(1 + β)PoolIm =
4(1 + r¯B)F [(1 + r¯B)c+ σ(c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex)]
(σpˆ)2q¯2
. (34)
It is straightforward to see that (1 + β)SepIm < (1 + β)
Pool
Im , since
(σ2 − σ)(c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex) < (1 + r¯B)(1− σ2)c¯.
This implies that, importers with (1 + β)PoolIm < (1 + β)Im < (1 + β)
BC
Im can play the sepa-
rating or the pooling equilibrium. However, the pooling equilibrium is Pareto-dominated for
financially constrained importers. To see this, compare the expected profits in both equi-
libria. Import transactions in a separating equilibrium take place with probability σ since
only high-quality exporters can provide an informative signal in form of SC. Contrarily, im-
port transactions with an uninformative signal take place with every type of exporter. An
importer receives a higher payoff in case of a pooling equilibrium if
σpiSepIm < pi
Pool
Im
This is fulfilled if
(1− σ)(1 + r¯B)F < 1
2
σpˆ
(
xPoolIm − xSepIm
)
. (35)
For every productivity level, xPoolIm < x
Sep
Im since σ < 1. Therefore, (35) does not hold since
the RHS is negative and the LHS is positive. Furhermore, recall that the exporter’s profit is
always set to 0. Hence, the separating equilibrium Pareto-dominates the pooling equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 9
Firms with (1 + β)Im ≥ (1 + β)BCIm prefer using pure bank financing to playing the
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separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium if piBCIm > σpi
Sep
Im . We find that this holds if
σ
c¯(1 + r¯B)
− 1
(1 + r¯B)c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex) >
4(1− σ)(1 + r¯B)F
σpˆ2(1 + β)q¯2
. (36)
For given values of σ and (1 + β), 36 holds if
1 + r¯Ex >
1
c¯− c
[
1
σ
c¯(1+r¯B)
− 4(1−σ)(1+r¯B)F
σpˆ2(1+β)q¯2
]
.
For given values of (1 + r¯Ex) and (1 + β), 36 holds if
σ >
[
c¯(1+r¯B)
2pˆ2(1+β)q¯2
(1+r¯B)c+(c¯−c)(1+r¯Ex)
− 4(1 + r¯B)2F c¯
]
±
√[
4c(1 + r¯B)
2F − c¯(1+r¯B)2pˆ2(1+β)q¯2(1+r¯B)c+(c¯−c)(1+r¯Ex)
]2
− 16pˆ2(1 + β)q¯2(1 + r¯B)2c¯
2pˆ2(1 + β)q¯2
.
Since σ ∈ [0, 1], the case of subtracting the square root is not defined as σ < 0 in this case,
so there is a unique threshold of σ for which piBCIm > σpi
Sep
Im .
For given values of σ and (1 + r¯Ex), 36 holds if
1 + β >
4(1− σ)(1 + r¯B)F
σpˆ2q¯2
[
σ
c¯(1+r¯B)
− 1
(1+r¯B)c+(c¯−c)(1+r¯Ex)
] .
Therefore, the above equation is fulfilled for high values of σ, r¯Ex, and (1 + β). If the
informative signal is required, both types of exporters lack an incentive to deviate, for the
same reasons as above.
If pure bank financing is played by the importer, both exporters do not deviate. Pure
bank financing is the most preferred financing option for the low-quality type since she then
makes positive profits instead of zero profits.
Proof of Proposition 10
Comparing the imported quantities, we find that qSep1 > q
BC
1 if
(1 + r¯B)c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex) < 1 + r¯B
σ
c¯. (37)
This is fulfilled for a given value of σ if
1 + r¯Ex <
1
c¯− c
[
1 + r¯B
σ
c¯− (1 + r¯B)c
]
.
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For a given value of (1 + r¯Ex) this is fulfilled if
σ <
(1 + r¯B)c¯
(1 + r¯B)c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯Ex) .
Therefore, imported quantities are higher from partial SC financing than pure bank financing
if uncertainty is high (low σ) and if the exporter refinancing costs are low.
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